Interpretation of crime of “men rape” under international criminal justice

The present work has attempted to analyze sexual crimes and especially the crime of male rape. The international jurisprudence of international criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court has tried to qualify rape either as a crime of genocide in the form of serious bodily and physical injuries, even if not necessarily permanent (lett. b) art. 6 of the Rome Statute; or as a crime against humanity where there are elements of context and above all material elements that emerge from the definitions given by the ad hoc Tribunals and the elements of crimes; or even as a war crime in case it is implemented as a part of a political plan or design, or as part of series of similar crimes committed on a large scale. This behavior is rebuilt in a residual way compared to that of sexual violence, according to a gender specific relationship to speciem. The indication of the level of gravity of the crime is necessary for the relevance of sexual violence and rape as crimes against humanity that we will see in the next years from the panorama of international criminal law.


Introduction
The latest military developments/actions in Syria (April 2018) remind us once again the "huge volume of overwhelming testimonies", pictures and videos that document the so-called report: "implementation of the Resolution establishing the international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most The absence of a commonly accepted definition of rape 37 in international law proved a real challenge for the ICTY 38 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) regarding the prosecution of sexual crimes 39 . The systematic rape of men in Rwanda and Bosnia eventually imposed the development of Court jurisprudence 40 allowing them to contribute to international humanitarian law 41 and human rights law 42 , particularly with regard to gender-based crimes 43 , a development that is clearly reflected in both the Statute of Rome of the ICT 44 and the Statute of the SCSL 45 . 36 In case: Kunarac we have a description, rectius definition of rape as: "(...) the trial panel found that the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The men area is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim (...)". In particular the Tribunal has affirmed that: "(...) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the contents of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim (…). See also: M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, P. MANIKAS, The law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers 1996, pp. 555ss. K.D. ASKIN, War crimes against women: prosecution in international war crimes Tribunals, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, pp. 380-382. See also the case: Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment, par. 207 (ICTY, July 21, 2000): "(...) the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The men's rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim (...)". P. WEINER, The evolving jurisprudence of the crime of rape in international criminal law, in Boston College Law Review, 2013, pp. 1210ss. See in the same spirit also: Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, parr. 146-148. The second element of the actus reus of rape refers to the circumstances; "(...) which would render the sexual act in the first element criminal. The essence of this element is that it describes those circumstances in which the person could not be said to have voluntarily and genuinely consented to the act. The use or threat of force provides clear evidence of non consent, but it is not required (…) true consent will not be possible (...) the last part of this element refers to those situations where, even in the absence of force or coercion, a person cannot be said to genuinely have consented to the son may not, for instance, be capable of genuinely consenting if he or she is too young, under the influence of some substance, or suffering from an illness or disability (...)". In particular Paragraph 147 of the decision refers to the Kunarac appeal judgment as describing circumstances relating to "lack of consent". The definition derives from the ICC elements of the crime of rape, where "lack of consent" was rejected as an element adopted, in the area was generally very difficult. It is unclear what this reasoning in Sesay (Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Appeal Judgment, parr. 85-92 (Oct. 26, 2009)) was intended to accomplish. According to the Court: it may be deemed proven: "(...) if the Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware, or had reason to be aware, of the coercive circumstances that undermined the possibility of genuine consent (...)". 37 A. GRABERT, Dynamic interpretation in international criminal law. Striking a balance between stability and change, ed. C.H. Beck, 2015, pp. 68-73. 38 Prosecutor v. Šainović (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-05-87-A Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014 ; Prosecutor v. Ðordević (Trial Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-05-87/1-T, 23 February 2011 at (2). 39 18 The Akayesu case is the first in international criminal justice to provide a definition of rape 46 .
The ICTR, in its attempt to define this crime, initially concluded that there was indeed no established definition in international law and assessed the criminalization of crime in national jurisprudence in order to explore the general principles that have been shaped 47 . Although it found that domestic criminal codes have long Grabert defined rapes as "non-consensual sexual intercourse" 48 , the ICTR argued that it is necessary to provide a wider definition, aiming at taking into account the particular context of international criminal law and the peculiarities in its forms of violence recorded in Rwanda. According to the Court, "(...) variants of the act of rape may include the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily cavities which are not inherently sexual" 49 . By providing a more liberal perception of rape, the Court ruled that rape is a form of assault 50 and that its constitutive elements "can not be isolated in a mechanistic description of objects and parts of the body" 51 . In fact, the ICTR made a correlation between rape and torture 52 , first of all finding that rape is torture and then stressing that the Convention against torture does not contain specific acts of torture, emphasizing the way this is done and the "idea" of the offense, rather than on the specific acts which constitute it, an approach which, according to the Court, is the most appropriate in international law. The Tribunal therefore defined rape as a "physical invasion of a sexual nature committed against a person under conditions of coercion" 53 . At the same time, the Tribunal attributed an equal definition to sexual violence in general, which includes rape, as "any act of a sexual nature committed against a person under 46 B. ABEGUNDE, Re-examination of rape and its growing jurisprudence under international law, in Journal of Politics He was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented whilst hundreds of murders, violations on women, and other atrocities were being committed daily. His inaction amounts to criminal negligence (...) from his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have been aware of what was happening (…) that Matsui knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the City enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as it is now known, and he must have known (...) he had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge his duty (...)". M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes against humanity in international criminal law, Kluwer Law International 1999, pp. 348ss. 52 C. TOFAN, Torture in international criminal law, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011. 53 The Tribunal affirmed also, that: "coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women (...)". LIAKOPOULOS 19 conditions of compulsion" 54 . In particular, the latter stressed that it was not limited to bodily violation of human body and may even include acts that do not involve penetration or even physical contact. As regards rape, concluding that the use of part of the body does not necessarily have to take into account the incident of penetrating a piece of wood into a woman's and men sexual organs 55 .
The extended definition of rape in the Akayesu case differs from the traditional definition in two ways 56 . First, the definition given by the Tribunal includes forced oral and rectal sexual intercourse, as well as the penetration of a finger or tongue into the vagina 57 .
In contrast, according to the traditional approach of domestic legislation, these acts are classified as sodomy or some other forms of sexual violence 58 . Secondly, because this definition is sex neutral, the victim could be the man and the actor the woman. This perception differs equally from traditional law, since the latter perceives rape as a crime that only a man can commit against a woman, allowing incarceration of the woman only as an accomplice. This decision also has another pioneering premise. The Tribunal concluded that the magnitude of coercion required does not have to reach the level of physical violence, as "threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of coercion that exploit fear and despair may be coercion, and coercion may be inherent in specific circumstances, such as armed conflict 59 or military presence of Interhamwe among Tutsi refugee women in the community office" 60 .
The Tribunal, therefore, has only widely accepted the concept of rape and sexual violence 61 , but has also expressed a widespread perception of coercion by emphasizing the particular nature of Thus, the element of non-consensus is fulfilled, without the necessity of proof of violence or coercion 63 , since the burden falls on the perpetrator and the victim and the context in which the crimes of sexual violence were committed. This assumption leads to the further result of the elimination of the need to witness and cross-check the relevant deposits 64 , but also to the reluctance of victims to make detailed descriptions of the crimes against them 65 . As well as the analogy with the crime of torture in which the Tribunal took refuge, which does not contain the element of consensus.
Coercion is therefore the element that characterizes the rape crime in international law: in the context of genocide 66 , crimes against humanity 67 and war crimes 68 , when a sexual act is imposed on a person, the issue of consensus becomes redundant.
Although the Akayesu case was accepted as setting an important limit of protection, it was also criticized that it was too broad, not quite specific and possibly as violating the principle of legality 69 . Alison Cole criticized the Tribunal for its failure in this case to follow the observance of two international rules when exporting the definition, the nullum crimen sine lege principle 70 , and identifying the correct sources of international law. However, the decision was generally welcomed, as many were the ones who praised her for her creativity and her contribution to the punishment of perpetrators of sexual violence 71 .
The Special Expert on Violence Against Women and Men stated that the definition reinstates rape as an attack on the personal security of a woman as a person and not as a violation of the honor of the entire family or village 72 . As advocate General Louis Arbour noted, "the decision is truly 21 remarkable in its broadness and perspective, as well as in the detailed legal analysis of many issues that will be critical to the ICTY 73 and the ICTR, particularly in relation to the law of sexual violence" 74 .
The definition of rape as set out in the Akayesu judgment was also adopted in the judgments which followed Akayesu at the ICTR, the Tribunal, by adopting the broad definition of rape, as formulated in the Akayesu case and then in Čelebići 79 , once again underlined that "(...) the essence of rape is not the particular details of the parts of the body and the objects involved, but rather the assault expressed in a sexual manner under coercive conditions" 80 . Explaining the difference in the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc tribunals 81 , notably as regards the adoption by the ICTY 82 of a mechanistic approach to rape 83 , concluded that the conceptual approach to rape is preferable because of the dynamic continuum of rape understanding and its integration into the principles of international law 84 . He rejected the tendency to focus the problem on the sexual intercourse as a prerequisite for national laws to include acts performed on objects or parts of the body which are not inherently sexual 85 . The ICTR, however, did not refer to which 24 Tribunal considered that the specialty and the precision in the determination of the objective status were considered necessary to ensure procedural guarantees. The Tribunal, therefore emphasized the distinction between rape, which is described as a crime against humanity in the ICTY Statute 105 , and other less serious forms of sexual abuse, which could be prosecuted as "other inhuman acts" 106 .
It also stressed that rape should be seen as "the most serious form of sexual abuse" 107 . Thus, the elements of rape in international law, according to the ICTY, are considered as follows: "(i) Tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced marriage shares certain elements wipalmerth sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors. First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the "husband" and "wife," which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. These distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime. The Trial Chamber, therefore, erred in holding that the evidence of forced marriage is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery (...)". The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Ongwen (ICC, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, PTC II, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, case no. ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, 23 March 2016, para. 88) concurred with the SCSL Appeal Chamber in Brima et al, holding that forced marriage may constitute "other inhumane acts": "(...) not explicitly include "forced marriage" as a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. The question before the Chamber is therefore whether the conduct attributed to (the accused) (i.e. to have forced women to serve as "conjugal partners" to himself and other LRA fighters in the Sinia brigade) constitutes an other inhumane act of a character similar to the acts set out in article 7(1)(a) to (j) intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. This is largely a question of fact, but the application of the gravity threshold of article 7(1)(k) of the Statute is also a question of law, as is the question of whether the conduct described as "forced marriage" is not otherwise subsumed by the crime of sexual slavery (.. Therefore, while in its explanation, the ICTY laid the foundations for adopting a broad perception of the definition 120 ,similar to that of Akayesu, it nevertheless appeared that it finally closed the door to adopt a conservative and largely incompatible position with the circumstances of the offenses 121 . Shortly thereafter, the ICTY came to reinstate the Kunarac case 122 with the broad but concise and detailed concept of rape. Once again, the Tribunal has established that there is no definition resulting from customary or conventional international law, either international human rights law or humanitarian law. It then examined the definition adopted in   Prosecutor claimed that lack of consensus was not an element of crime, as opposed to violence and coercion 132 . However, the Tribunal separated its position from the Prosecutor, stating that the basic common element of the legal systems investigated is that sexual penetration constitutes the crime of rape if it is not truly consensual or voluntary on the victim's side 133 .
It found that the elements of rape crime were not limited to violence, the threat of violence or coercion. The weight, according to the Tribunal, must be attributed to the violation of sexual autonomy because "the real common denominator uniting the various systems is the principle of criminalizing violations of sexual autonomy" 134 . Sexual autonomy is also violated whenever the person is subjected to an act to which he or she has not freely agreed or voluntary participated 135 .
Thus, lack of consensus is the sine qua non of rape and the element of coercion, violence or threat of violence are only some aspects that can prove the lack of consensus. The question of consensus was raised by one of the defendants, Kunarac, who claimed that once the thief itself had testified that intercourse was on its own initiative, he could not have known that he did not consent. As the victim was in captivity and the initiative came from the threats that he accepted, the Tribunal found that he had not consented freely 136 . See also in argument the next cases: Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (...) in this regard, courts have been willing to close certain proceedings to account for the concerns of witnesses. If a partial closure is requested, i.e., excluding only certain spectators, there must be a "substantial reason" for such closure, whereas a full closure to the public and press requires an "overriding interest" (.. Gacumbitsi was found guilty of genocide 156 and rape for a crime against humanity 157 , which led the Tribunal to reconsider previous rape case law, concluding that the Akayesu and Kunarac judgments, although they have different approaches, can reconcile 158 . The lack of consent of the victim was proven by the fact that Gacumbitsi had threatened to kill the victims horribly in case they resisted and the fact that those who escaped were eventually attacked 159 . During the trial, the Prosecutor claimed that the lack of consensus and the relative knowledge of the accused are not elements of rape crime 160 . Instead, according to him, rape must be preceded in the same way as  Consequently, the Gacumbitsi Court of Appeal held that the definition of Kunarac, both conceptually and de jure, prevailed. The conclusion of Gacumbitsi has sparked intense controversy and was the subject of academic and bibliographic criticism 167 . Schomberg argues that the unequal position of the perpetrator and the victim is an intrinsic element in cases where rape is committed during the war and ultimately leads to international crime 168 . Lack of consensus is not appropriate under international law once it is proved that the sexual act was committed in a context where sexual autonomy is generally absent.

3.Definition of rape at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
The SCSL also faced the need to define the crime of rape 169  Assessing the first paragraph, the Court explained the broad perception of sexual acts, noting that the first element of the objective hypothesis defines the type of violation required to establish the rape offense and covers two types of penetration, even light. The first part refers to the penetration of any part of the body, either the victim or the accused with a sexual organ, while the phrase "any part of the body" includes genital, rectal or oral penetration 175 .
The second part refers to penetrating the genital or anal cavity with any object or any part of the body that covers penetration with anything else, the object or part of the body, except for the genitals. The Court notes that this definition is broad enough to be sex-neutral as both men and women can be raped 176 . The decision attempted to clarify the role of the second paragraph, noting that the second element of the objective hypostasis refers to those circumstances that make the sexual act of the first element criminal. It describes essentially the circumstances in which a person has not voluntarily or genuinely consented to the act, whereas the use of threats or violence provides clear evidence of non-consent, but does not require its existence, since in cases where crimes are international, consent is almost universally impossible. With regard to the last part of this element, it refers essentially to the fact that even if there is no violence or coercion, it is not necessary for the person to have given his true consent in practice because he where the accused was finally convicted of rape as a crime against humanity, the SCSL applied a slightly different definition to Kunarac, important elements of which, like the aforementioned decision, were finally included in the ICT for crime facts 179 .

4.Definition of rape by ICC
The Preparatory Committee of ICC was mainly influenced by the ICTY and the ICTR case-law and the elements of crimes, a text intended to assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6 (genocide), 7 (crimes against humanity) and 8 (war crimes). Of course, in ICC, the elements of rape are the same, regardless of whether rape is prosecuted as a war crime 180 or a crime against humanity 181 . Thus, rape is defined as follows: 1. the offender violated a person's body by actions that resulted in the penetration, regardless of gravity, of any part of the body of the victim or the accused with a sexual organ, or of the oral or rectal cavity victim with any object or part of the body 182 ; 2. the violation was committed with violence or threat of violence or coercion such as that caused by fear of violence, coercion, detention, psychological 177 36 been copied in the laws created by the Courts of Cambodia (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia-ECCC) 194 and the special panels for serious crimes in East Timor 195 , which have already been issued a conviction for the rape crime in the Cardoso case 196 . I suggest that they are worth exploring, as they hold out the possibility of complementing the inevitably limited narratives which emerge through criminal proceedings and bringing us closer to making the more complex and subtle narratives of women's and men experiences "fully visible" 197 .
In the end, we can say that the extensive efforts of court judges in the ICTY and ICTR to identify and develop the definition of rape as an international crime 198 provides a classic illustration of the operation of the case-law interpretation 199 . Akayesu is the perfect archetype of jurisprudence 200 , while Furundžιja and Kunarac propose a more cautious approach, quite detailed, based on the principle of speciality. At the same time, other decisions, such as Musema and Muhimana 201 , attempt to create a harmonious interpretation of existing case law. However, although these efforts have been a milestone in international criminal jurisprudence and contributed to the development of international criminal law, this issue continues to concern the courts and academics. The contradictory versions at times raises a number of concerns in the context of human rights law, and in particular the impact that different and often conflicting definitions may have on the right to equal access to justice. As Patricia Viseur Sellers points out, different definitions of rape may result in a 16-year-old men in the civil war in Sierra Leone 202 being less protected from gay violence than a 16-year-old men who has been sexually abused by an actor, who will be tried before the ICC 203 .

5.Concluding remarks
In practice, the two international criminal tribunals have acknowledged that sexual violence can constitute a bunch of other additional crimes, including war crimes of torture 204 and attacks on personal dignity 205 , the crime against humanity not only of rape but also of sexual enslavement 206 , persecution, and the crime of genocide 207 . With regard to ICC, the statute of the latter includes specific gender-based crimes, such as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, pregnancy and sterilization-on the basis of both war crime 208 and crimes against humanity 209 . As regards the crimes of genocide, the elements of crimes state that although rape is not listed as a form of genocide, the latter caused by acts of "serious physical or mental harm" 210 , including "acts of torture, rape, sexual violence, inhuman or degrading treatment" 211 . However, the process of joining an act of sexual violence in the formal legal arena may be a painful process of many victims 212 . Not only can they experience a tremendous psychological strain because they have to go ahead and tell the violations against it 213 , but they may be forced to confront it with the established gender bias and rape perceptions of the system itself responsible for providing justice.
Obstacles to the process are multiple: lack of effective cooperation between health care staff and legal system, structural and resource constraints on law enforcement, lack of forensic analysis and problems of the courts themselves. Poor cooperation between investigators and prosecutors and the consequent inability to prove or attribute accusations and finally lack of sensitivity to judicial proceedings that "reconstitute" the victim's trauma 214 . But besides the victims, researchers and prosecutors may in turn encounter specific challenges, as they promote a case of 204 38 sexual violence through the legal system. Besides the victims, researchers and prosecutors may in turn encounter specific challenges, as they promote a case of sexual violence through the legal system. The often private character of rape 215 , for example, rarely offers the possibility of eyewitnesses, support that can be provided to other crimes. And whether the subject is the identity of the offender or the lack of consensus on sexual intercourse, prosecutors are often called upon to fight against gender bias or misconceptions about the nature of sexual violence.
With regard to the proof of international sex crimes 216 , additional proofs arise: how can one collect consistent evidence of a crimes committed against countless people after many years? how can one assign responsibility to a military or political commander who may have never given a direct or immediate mandate to commit rape?
There are, however, many promising strategies for managing cases of sexual violence. These strategies have evolved, both in the domestic and international contexts. These may consist either of efforts to integrate awareness of sexual violence (as well as universal education across the range of research) or inter tactics aimed at developing expertise in the field of sexual violence crimes within the body of experts 217 . Innovations within an international body may have a significant impact on future developments within national or local criminal justice systems, including a context of more extensive use of gender experts, increased coordination between prosecutors and investigations and the increased protection measures of witnesses 218 .
Indeed, the new Prosecutor's Office paper on gender and sexual crimes provides a set of coherent and integrated goals towards more effective justice and recognition of the harm suffered by victims of sexual and gender-based violence, in the context of permanent international jurisdiction instrument. Whether the ICC will eventually become the catalyst for the eradication of sexual violence, mainly as a weapon 219 or war strategy 220 , and how soon it will be demonstrated by the progress it will make in the next period 221 . 215 See, Appeal Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Ntaganda against the "second Decision on the Defence's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9", (15 June 2017, par. 16 ). For the first time, the ICC judges have enshrined that any question submitted to them, and therefore also those relating to the interpretation of war crimes, must be resolved only on the basis of the law of the founding Charter. And secondly because in providing an interpretation of the aforementioned clause, the judges of the Chamber of Appeal seem to have given greater weight to the possibility of enhancing the object and purpose of the Statute rather than safeguarding the coherence and unity of the corpus of law and especially under international humanitarian. In this last perspective, it is important to underline the reference to the absolute prohibition of subjecting anyone to rape and sexual violence in the context of armed conflict, which appears without a shadow of doubt in line not only with the purpose of the ICC act, but above all with the evolution of international human rights law. Rigorous opinion that has found application of the nexus requirement to prevent an illegitimate expansion of the scope of war crimes rules in the Appeal Chamber, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Ntaganda against the "Second decision on the Defence's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9", 15 June 2017, par. 68. T. RODENHÄUSER, Squaring the circle? Prosecuting sexual violence against child soldiers by their "own forces", in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2016, pp. 171-186.  the Prosecutor's Office to apply this new approach that has been adopted in the policy document.
Besides, the ICC already has reason to believe that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) committed crimes against the civilian population in Colombia 223 , which are violations of the Rome Statute 224 , and has already stated that it will proceed to prosecution of the international crimes committed in Colombia if the Colombian government does not manage to do so effectively. While international law provides the platform for the recognition of a set of universal rights, it is only the starting point from which the appropriate approach to justice will be diversified. Although the ICC is currently focusing on the investigation of situations in African countries and not only 225 , it is crucial to distinguish the details of sexual violence in different contexts in order to formulate responses that respond to the particular need of survivors and communities, and this can achieved only if survivors are incorporated into the process of redefining how they see justice themselves, especially in ways that fit their country's political history and culture. If the ICC wants to play the role of deterring the most serious human tights violations and make progress to that end, it must integrate gender equality more prominently across the range of proceedings before the Court 226 .