SYMPATHETIC SOLIDARITY: RETHINKING SOLIDARITY AS A POLITICAL EMOTION WITH ADAM SMITH

Bastian Ronge

ABSTRACT

In this paper I refer to Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy as stated in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759) in order to develop a three-dimensional account of solidarity as a political emotion. This account allows for a reconsideration of key features of solidarity, as discussed in the (German) scholarship on solidarity, within a theoretical framework that takes the emotional foundations of solidarity seriously. Moreover, it makes us aware also of two particular problems of solidarity as a political emotion: The problem of colonizing emotions, which is often implied in the struggle for solidarity, and the problem of exploiting the emotion of solidarity for particular political reasons.

Keywords: Adam Smith, solidarity, sympathy, political emotions, Theory of Moral Sentiments

RESUMO

Neste artigo, eu me volto à teoria da simpatia de Adam Smith, tal como apresentado na sua “Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais” (1759), a fim de desenvolver uma abordagem tridimensional da solidariedade como uma emoção política. Esta abordagem permite uma reconsideração de pontos chaves da solidariedade, como é discutido no debate (alemão) sobre este conceito, dentro de um marco teórico que considera seriamente os alicerces emotivos da solidariedade. Além disso, isto nos torna conscientes também de dois problemas particulares da solidariedade como uma emoção política: o problema de colonizar emoções, que frequentemente está presente na luta por solidariedade, e o problema da exploração da emoção da solidariedade por razões políticas particulares.

Palavras-chave: Adam Smith, solidariedade, simpatia, emoções políticas, Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais

---

1 This paper was written in the context of the project "Out of balance. The concepts of market and crisis within the framework of a Critical Theory of the Economical", funded by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin as part of the Excellence Initiative of the German federal and state governments.

2 Currently Postdoc at the Humboldt-University of Berlin, where he works primarily on Critical Theory of the Economical and Solidarity Economy.
Introduction

Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité – these were the famous three keywords of the French Revolution. More than 200 years later, thousands of philosophical books and articles have been written on freedom and equality (i.e. justice), while the concept of solidarity has largely been ignored.³ Solidarity is still a “wisy-washy concept” (JAEGGI 2001, p. 287) with lots of meanings but without any clear conceptual foundations. What is the reason for this lack of conceptual work?

Most scholars agree on the thesis that the conceptual shortcoming is related to the profound and lasting influence of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s moral philosophy is based on two premises: Moral behavior should be grounded in rational reasons, and moral behavior should be guided by universal claims about what is right and wrong. This particular understanding of moral philosophy is unable to conceptualize solidarity, since solidarity is the name for moral behavior motivated by feelings and directed at particular groups of people. Solidarity is based on emotion (rather than on rational reason) and aims at particular moral norms (rather than universal ones). Hence, it comes at no surprise that Kantian moral philosophy struggles with the phenomenon of solidarity (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, p. 13f.; MÜNKLER 2004, p. 17). To put it in another way: As long as the discourse of moral philosophy is dominated by the Kantian tradition, the phenomenon of solidarity will necessarily remain underconceptualized. At the same time, the need for conceptual work on solidarity becomes more and more pressing. As yet, the 21st century is characterized by global ecological and economic crises, which can no longer be tackled with the means of the classical nation state. Hence the question arises which moral concepts can be scaled up to a global level without losing their motivational power. The concept of solidarity seems to be a promising candidate for his operation. It is not bound to the confines of the nation state and has – as an emotion – enough motivational power to trigger solidarian behavior. Thus it seems to be time for philosophers to turn to the phenomenon of solidarity and try to conceptualize solidarity as a political and moral emotion.

In the following I want to respond to this call by reexamining the moral philosophy of Adam Smith. Reducing him to the man who invented modern economics, it is often ignored that Smith was one of the most influential moral philosophers in the 18th century. His “Theory of Moral Sentiments”, first published in 1759, was a major success during his lifetime and turned him into one of the most prominent representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. Since his whole moral philosophy is grounded in the notion of *sympathy*, he is a promising author to rethink solidarity as a political and moral emotion, as I want to show throughout the paper. I intend to show that Smith’s theory of sympathy enables us to distinguish between three different dimensions of solidarity that are constitutive for solidarity as a political emotion. To develop this thesis, I will proceed in three steps. In the first part of the paper, I reconstruct Smith’s theory of sympathy as developed in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”. In the second part, I present some key features of solidarity as pointed out within the (German) scholarship. In the third part, I demonstrate how Smith’s theory of sympathy helps us to distinguish between three dimensions of solidarity and reconsider some of the key features discussed within an emotion-based framework of solidarity.

1. Part: Adam Smith’s Theory of Sympathy: Three concepts of sympathy

In recent years, various Adam Smith scholars have shown that the leading figure of the Scottish Enlightenment can help us to answer pressing questions of contemporary social and political philosophy (cf. HERZOG 2013, WEINSTEIN 2013). This holds true also for the challenge of discussing solidarity – one “idea of the future” (MÜNKER 2004, my translation) that has not been convincingly conceptualized yet. In order to demonstrate this, I start with reconstructing the various concepts of sympathy present in Smith’s “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (SMITH 1976; in the following referred to as TMS).

---

4 In recent years, the philosophy of emotions has shown that emotions and feelings are not irrational, but should be regarded as semi-rational phenomena which play an important role in our moral behaviour (cf. DÖRING 2009). This revaluation of emotions goes along with a rediscovery of 18th century Scottish philosophy, since thinkers like Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith reflected upon the role of emotions in moral life. This holds true in particular for Adam Smith, since his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” can be regarded as the most fully developed account of Scottish Moral Philosophy.

5 As far as I know, the attempt to rethink solidarity with Smith’s theory of sympathy has not been undertaken within the Smith scholarship so far. Dieter Thomä, however, also focuses on the conceptual relationship between sympathy and solidarity (respectively fraternalism) with regards to Smith in his forthcoming article “Synergie und Sympathie. Eine sozialphilosophische Skizze” [Synergy and Sympathy - A draft in social philosophy] (cf. THOMÄ 2016).
The first concept of sympathy is mentioned right at the beginning of the book. Adam Smith starts his conceptual work on sympathy with an interesting case. Let us imagine we are in a museum with a friend. Together with him or her we stand in front of a picture. By looking at the picture, we and our friend experience a similar feeling, e.g. the feeling of surprise or disgust or whatever. This kind of “perfect harmony of sentiments and affections” (TMS, 19) occurs easily between persons when they are both affected by the same external impact.

“The beauty of a plain, the greatness of a mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expression of a picture, the composition of a discourse, the conduct of a third person […] We both look at them from the same point of view, and we have no occasion for sympathy, of for that imaginary change of situation from which it arises, in order to produce, with regards to these, the most perfect harmony of sentiments and affections.” (TMS, 19)

This type of emotional correspondence, however, should not be called sympathy. Although sympathy is generally the name for the emotional correspondence between persons, Adam Smith avoids the notion in this case, since there is no “imaginary change of situation” (TMS, 19) as it is constitutive for sympathetic interactions. In other words: Proper sympathy occurs only between a spectator (SP) and a person principally concerned (PPC), namely between agents who are not in the same position but have an asymmetrical interrelation. The type of emotional correspondence arising among several PPCs due to the fact that they are all affected by an external impact in the same way should only be regarded as a kind of pseudo-sympathy.⁶

It is clear, however, that it is much easier to arrive at emotional correspondence under the condition of symmetry than under that of asymmetry. The spectator and the person principally concerned are in totally different emotional states. While the spectator is in an emotionally neutral mood of observing, the person principally concerned is emotionally upset. Nevertheless it is possible to bridge this gap in emotional intensity. The spectator has to put him- or herself in the situation of the person principally concerned and imagi-

⁶ Smith himself does not use the wording pseudo-sympathy. For the sake of my argument it is useful, however, to grant this kind of non-sympathy (from Smith’s point of view) a particular designation.
nes his or her feelings, while the person principally concerned has to reduce his or her emotions to that level of intensity which the spectator is “capable of going along with” (TMS, 22). But how can the person principally concerned lower the intensity of his or her emotions?

Smith gives a quite intriguing answer to this question: The person principally concerned has to carry out the same sympathetic operation as the spectator, namely put him- or herself in the situation of the spectator and imagine his or her feelings. In other words: The sympathetic interaction between the SP and the PPC is a circular process. The spectator evokes lively fellow-feelings by copying the original feelings of the person principally concerned, while the latter copies these fellow-feelings in order to reduce his original feelings to the affective level which the spectator is going along with.\(^7\)

If this sympathetic interaction between the SP and the PPC is successful, sympathy arises, and with this emotional correspondence moral approval accrues. With this point we touch upon the larger project Adam Smith carries out in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”. His overall goal is to describe and explain why human beings draw the moral judgments they do.\(^8\) His theory of sympathy is the key for answering this anthropological question, since sympathy, i.e. emotional correspondence between persons, is synonymous with moral approbation. If we have the same feeling as the person whose behavior we evaluate, our evaluation will be positive. We will approve of his or her behavior since we feel, more or less, the very feelings that guide the behavior in question. The same holds true for the negative case: If we do not have the same feelings as the PPC, we will disapprove of his or her behavior. Or to put it shortly: According to Smith, sympathy implies moral approval, while antipathy, i.e. emotional non-correspondence, implies moral disapproval.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) This circular process of emotional regulation strongly resembles Smith’s description of the circular process of price regulation, which he offers in the “Wealth of Nations” (cf. SMITH 1976, p. 75). As far as I see, the scholarship has ignored this resemblance so far.

\(^8\) In this respect, Smith’s “Theory of Moral Sentiments” strictly follows the research agenda of David Hume, namely to pursue a philosophical “science of man” that brings into focus human beings and their particular way of thinking and behaving; cf. BERRY 2006.

\(^9\) It is important to note, though, that we do not have to carry out this sympathetic interaction every time we make a moral judgement. After a particular amount of sympathetic moral judgements, we will deduce “general rules of morality” (TMS, 159), which enable us to come to moral judgement without performing sympathetic interactions with the PPC.
Things get more complicated, however, if we evaluate the behavior of another person not just under the perspective of being agreeable or non-agreeable, but also under that of being virtuous or vicious. This shift becomes necessary when the behavior in question is beneficial or harmful to another person. Smith explains our moral evaluation in this situation through the concept of indirect sympathy. While direct sympathy is the name for the sympathetic interaction between two agents, namely the spectator and the person principally concerned, the concept of indirect sympathy refers to the sympathetic interaction between three agents: The spectator, the person principally concerned and the person principally acting (PPA). In other words: Indirect sympathy refers to a triangular structure involving the emotionally neutral spectator, the person principally concerned, who is emotionally upset, and the person principally acting, who is responsible for the emotional reaction of the PPC.

ACTING ------»

Person Principally Acting (PPA) Person Principally Concerned (PPC)

«------REACTING

Spectator (SP)

The crucial point in this scenario of indirect sympathy is that the spectator has to carry out two (direct) sympathetic interactions before he or she can make a moral judgment about PPA’s behavior. The spectator has to feel sympathy with PPC and antipathy with PPA. Let us take an example: PPA acts in a way which the person principally concerned perceives as harmful and evokes in him or her the wish to punish PPA for his vicious behavior.

Whether the spectator agrees with PPC and also evaluates PPA’s behavior as vicious depends on two conditions. First, the spectator has to disapprove of PPA’s behavior. The sympathetic connection between SP and PPA must be disconnected. As long as the spectator feels sympathy for PPA, he or she will be unable to sympathize with PPC and his or her wish to punish PPA. Second, the spectator will only sympathize with PPC’s resentment against PPA, if PPC is able to reduce his or her emotion of resentment to the level the spectator can go

---

10 Please note that Smith himself does not use the notion “person principally acting”.
11 In the following, I will refer to this scenario as the „resentment-scenario“. Please note that Smith’s theory of indirect sympathy also holds true for the „merit-scenario“: If PPA is acting benevolently towards PPC, the latter wants to reward PPA.
along with. Otherwise the spectator is not able to adopt PPC’s moral judgment either. To put it in a nutshell: The spectator judges PPA’s behavior as vicious, if the sympathetic interaction with the person principally acting fails and, at the same time, the sympathetic interaction with the person principally concerned succeeds.

This very short reconstruction of Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy allows us to distinguish three notions of sympathy. *Pseudo-sympathy* refers to the emotional correspondence between persons who have a symmetrical relationship with each other and are affected by the same external impact. The notion of *direct sympathy* describes the emotional correspondence between persons who have an asymmetrical relationship with each other, since one person is in the position of the spectator while the other one is in the position of the person principally concerned. The concept of *indirect sympathy* describes sympathetic interactions within a triangular situation, which entails an asymmetrical relationship between SP and PPC respectively SP and PPA as well as an antagonistic relationship between PPC and PPA.\(^\text{12}\) In the third part of this paper, I will use these different concepts of sympathy to elaborate on the three dimensions of the political emotion of solidarity. Before I come to that, however, I want to present some key features of solidarity as discussed within the (German) scholarship on solidarity.

2. Part: The key features of solidarity

The lack of conceptual work on solidarity crystallizes in the missing definition of what solidarity is. As far as I can see, there exists no general, widely accepted definition of it. There are, however, some key features brought up in the scholarship time and again. In the following, I introduce some of these key elements, which seem to be essential to the phenomenon of solidarity.

Virtually all scholars point out the fact that solidarity is an emotion – an emotion that occurs among a particular group of human beings (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, p. 12; ZOLL 2000, p. 195-200). Many authors consider this unique combination of “emotionality” and “particularity” to be the main reason why solidarity has not be satisfyingly conceptualized within a Kantian

\(^{12}\) Please note that this antagonistic dimension occurs only in a situation in which PPC is harmed by PPA’s behaviour, i.e. in the resentment scenario of Smith’s indirect sympathy-theory.
framework of moral philosophy (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, p. 13f.; MÜNKLER 2004, p. 17). Some authors have tackled this problem and tried to integrate solidarity into the hegemonic discourse of moral philosophy (cf. BAYERTZ 1998; DERPMANN 2013). This operation, however, tends to ignore the particularity and / or the emotional dimension of the concept.

Another key quality of solidarity seems to be its antagonistic dimension. Many authors point to the fact that solidarity is often grounded in the fight of one group of people against other social groups. An often-quoted example is the class solidarity of laborers in the 19th century (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, 41f.; HONDRIICH / KOCH-ARZBERGER 1992, p. 30f.; JAEGGI 2001, p. 298f.; ZOLL 2000, p. 54-77). Proletarians show solidarity with each other because they fight together against the ruling class. This “Kampf-Solidarität” [battle-solidarity] (BAYERTZ 1998, p. 49) has the characteristic of being particularistic and aggressive towards other social groups (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, p. 41; ZOLL 2000, p. 67). Even if many authors identify this antagonistic dimension to be characteristic for solidarity, they do not decide whether it is a constitutive or merely a contingent element of it.

A further very important element of solidarity appears to be commonality, i.e. the similarity of feelings, judgments and worldviews among people united by solidarity. Acting and behaving in similar ways is as much characteristic for this kind of “Gemeinschafts-Solidarität” [communal solidarity] (BAYERTZ 1998, p. 49) as vouching for one another in times of need. It is remains unclear, however, whether this form of solidarity is socially invented, naturally given or “neither given nor invented” (JAEGGI 2001, p. 288; cf. also HONDRIICH / KOCH-ARZBERGER 1992, p. 16-20).

A final key feature of solidarity is that it cannot be reduced to either egoism or altruism. Even though people united by solidarity may have a common interest, like the proletarians who fight for their rights, the solidarity among them cannot be explained by referring to the egoist self-interest of each of them. Showing solidarity implies to risk something, means to stand up for something without knowing whether this engagement pays off. Solidarity hence cannot be reduced to some kind of enlightened self-interest (JAEGGI 2001, p. 289; p. 292). But it cannot be reduced to altruism or mere compassion.
either, since we show solidarity only if something matters to us. We have an interest in being and acting solidarity, but this interest is more than self-interest. To put it bluntly: Solidarity can neither be traced back to mere egoistic motifs nor to altruistic ones. It is something in-between. It remains an open question, however, how to conceptualize this “in-betweeness” of solidarity.

These brief remarks cannot provide a full picture of the theoretical debate on solidarity (in Germany). They do, however, bring into focus the central points at stake in the theoretical discussion. In the following, I intend to show how Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy may be used to distinguish between three dimensions of solidarity and to reevaluate many of the key features of solidarity discussed within the (German) scholarship.

3. Part: The three dimensions of solidarity

I now want to argue that the various concepts of sympathy Adam Smith elaborates in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (cf. Part 1) can help us to understand solidarity as a particular political emotion and to distinguish its three distinct dimensions: (1.) the unifying dimension, (2.) the supportive dimension and (3.) the antagonistic dimension of solidarity. I use the wording “dimensions” of solidarity with intent, since I think that one and the same phenomenon can have various dimensions of solidarity; it can have just one dimension (e.g. the supportive dimension) or two dimensions or even all three dimensions. Speaking about various “forms” or “types” of solidarity, on the contrary, would insinuate that every phenomenon of solidarity is strictly correlated to one distinguished form or type of solidarity. Having said this, I would like to go through the three dimensions of solidarity, which are identifiable with recourse to Adam Smith and his theory of sympathy.

(1.) The unifying dimension of solidarity: The first dimension of solidarity may be called the unifying dimension. The notion refers to the emotional correspondence between persons principally concerned, i.e. to Smith’s theory of pseudo-sympathy. If people are affected by one and the same external

---

13 Rahel Jaeggi so far has given the most compelling answer. As she shares the same intuition, namely that solidarity “transcend[s] the opposition between altruistic and egoistic motivations” (JAEGGI 2001, 292), she tries to explain the in-betweeness of solidarity with the concept of form of life. Since Solidarity “has to be understood as an engagement that is related […] to the preservation of this common form of life”, this engagement is “neither egoistic nor altruistic” (JAEGGI 2001, 295). By supporting the other, I support myself.
impact – no matter whether this impact is a natural catastrophe, a terrorist attack or a future goal\textsuperscript{14} – and respond to it in a similar way, they will arrive at a state of emotional correspondence. This emotional harmony leads to similar patterns of feelings, thoughts and moral evaluations; in other words, it leads to commonality. Hence Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy allows us to shed light on one of the key features of solidarity. It allows us to identify communal solidarity as the outcome of sympathetic interactions among persons principally concerned, and to tackle the question whether this commonality is naturally given or socially invented. According to Smith’s theory, the unifying dimension of solidarity is “neither given nor invented” (JAEGGI 2001, p. 288) or – to be more precise – it is\textit{ given as well as invented}. It is given, since the unifying dimension of solidarity depends on the fact that people are affected by the same external impact. But it is also\textit{ invented}, since the emotional correspondence between the persons principally concerned also depends on the sympathetic interactions among the PPCs. If the PPCs do not realize that they react similarly to the external impact, pseudo-sympathy, i.e. the unifying effect of solidarity, cannot come into existence.

\textbf{(2) The supportive dimension of solidarity.} It is often mentioned in the scholarship that solidarity has something to do with supporting others in non-egoistic as well as non-altruistic ways. Adam Smith’s theory of direct sympathy can help us to gain a better understanding of this key feature of solidarity. The dimension of supportive solidarity can be described as the emotional correspondence arising between a spectator and a person principally concerned. A typical example for this is the case of solidarity in the aftermath of natural catastrophes (like earth quakes, seismic sea waves and so on). Natural catastrophes lead to unifying solidarity amongst those who are primarily affected by this external impact. Often they do also create supportive solidarity from non-primarily-affected spectators. The spectators put themselves in the shoes of the person(s) principally concerned and evoke in themselves a feeling of fellow-grief or fellow-anxiety. Hence, they approve the way in which the PPCs react to the catastrophe and support their reaction in a material and/or symbolic way (cf. BAYERTZ 1998, p. 49). Adam Smith provides us with an expla-

\textsuperscript{14} I would like to argue that future goals could also be described as external impact and that concerted action could, therefore, also be described within Smith’s framework of sympathetic interactions. Dieter Thomä is right, however, when he states, that the dimension of synergia, i.e. of common actions, is under theorized in Smith (cf. Thomä 2016, p. 121).
nation why solidarity can be reduced to neither an egoistic nor an altruistic emotion. Sympathetic fellow-feelings made of emotions we once endured ourselves are revived in the process of sympathetic identification with the person principally concerned. In other words: Sympathetic emotions are, by nature, a hybrid between our own emotions and the emotions of others. Solidarity is thus an emotion situated in-between the other and us.

Smith also allows us to identify a particular problem of international solidarity. Supportive solidarity can only come into existence if the PPC reduces its emotional behavior to the level which the SP can go along with. This condition might become problematic in the case of international, i.e. inter-cultural solidarity, since the language of emotions can vary substantially between various cultures. It might be the case that the particular way of expressing grief and mourning performed by the PPC does not resonate with the language of emotions “known” by the spectator. He or she will thus not be able to show solidarity with the PPC. The difference of emotional languages could therefore be a huge problem for generating international, or cross-cultural, solidarity. Overcoming this problem may cause still another problem, though. As a matter of fact, the most powerful international spectator is the Western world. Hence the western language of emotions is a standard to which many PPCs try to conform in order to get supportive solidarity from the West. This should be regarded, however, as a particular case of colonization, namely a form of colonizing emotions. Advocates of international, i.e. cross-cultural solidarity must take this difficult issue into account.

(3) The antagonistic dimension of solidarity. Almost all authors writing on solidarity admit the fact that solidarity has something to do with fighting another social group. Smith’s theory of sympathy enables us to arrive at a better understanding of this battle-solidarity. The antagonistic dimension of solidarity turns out to be a special form of the unifying dimension of solidarity in the same way that indirect sympathy is a special form of direct sympathy. The fighting group reacts to the external impact in an aggressive way, just like the PPC to the PPA in the resentment-scenario of Smith’s theory. The same conditions, which hold for the success of sympathetic interactions with the resentment-scenario also hold for the potential emergence of battle-solidarity. We only feel inclined to show solidarity with the fight of a group of PPC
against PPA, if we (1) also disapprove of PPA’s behavior towards PPC and (2) if we are able to generate a fellow-feeling with regards to the resentment or hate felt by the PPC. If one of the conditions is not fulfilled, the battle-solidarity cannot come into existence.

As the political scientist Herfried Münkler has pointed out, solidarity is a very important factor within political struggles (cf. MÜNKLER 2004, p. 21). Both parties involved try to get the spectator’s supportive solidarity for their fight against the other party. Smith’s theory of indirect sympathy allows us to reflect upon the sympathetic mechanisms informing this struggle for solidarity. As I have just mentioned above, indirect sympathy depends on two conditions. Solidarity with the fighting PPC can only occur, (1) if the spectator has an antipathetic relationship to the PPA and (2) if PPC is able to reduce his/her aggressive behavior to the level which the SP can go along with. According to these two conditions, PPA has two options in order to prevent solidarity for his counterpart PPC. First, PPA will try to transform the antipathetic relationship with the spectator into a sympathetic one by denying or explaining his or her harming behavior. If this strategy fails, i.e. if the spectator is convinced that PPA has done harm to PPC, PPA will change the strategy. He or she will now attempt to disrupt the sympathetic connection between PPC and the spectator. The most promising way to achieve this goal is to increase the pressure on PPC in order to provoke more aggressive reactions, since over-exaggerated or excessive behavior must bring the solidarity of the spectator to an end. PPC must, therefore, resist these provocations by PPA and avoid any over-aggressive behavior, which might jeopardize the solidarity of the spectator.15

Having said this, I want to sum up the results of the discussion so far. Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy allows us to distinguish three dimensions of solidarity, namely the unifying dimension, the supportive dimension and the antagonistic dimension of solidarity. As already mentioned above, I think it is important to refer to various dimensions rather than various forms of solidarity, since one and the same phenomenon might have one, two or all three dimensions of solidarity.

---

15 The principle of non-violence, prominently advocated and performed by Mahatma Ghandi, can be seen as the solution for this particular problem.
Let us take the example of a terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks seem to “invoke” all three dimension of solidarity. They lead to solidarity among those who have been primarily affected by the terrorist attack (unifying dimension). But they also lead to solidarity between those who have been primarily affected and the spectators of the event, which will support the PPCs in a material or symbolic way (donating blood, going to manifestations, performing minutes of silence, spending money and so on). Sometimes this supportive solidarity turns into battle-solidarity: If the PPC decides to take revenge for the terrorist attack, the supportive solidarity from the SP is asked to transform into supportive solidarity for the fight against PPA. In other words: Terrorist attacks are a good example to illustrate that the identical event releases various dimension of solidarity, and that the various dimension of solidarity have no clear-cut boundaries. In fact, the respective dimensions of solidarity seem to merge into each other. Supportive solidarity can become battle-solidarity; battle-solidarity can have unifying effects and so on. Put differently: Viewing solidarity as a political emotion does not mean to look at a stable phenomenon, but to look at a dynamic process, which is structured and influenced by the sympathetic interactions among the agents involved. With this I come to the conclusion.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I have tried to show that Adam Smith can help us to rethink solidarity as a political emotion. In his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”, Smith develops various concepts of sympathy (pseudo-sympathy, direct sympathy, indirect sympathy) (Part 1), which can be used in order to provide a sympathetic theory of the three dimensions of solidarity (Part 3). This account of solidarity has, as I have tried to show, two significant advantages. Firstly, it enables us to reconsider key elements, which have already been discussed in the (German) scholarship (Part 2), within a framework that takes the emotional foundation of solidarity seriously. The fact than solidarity is “‘neither given nor invented’” (JAEGGI 2001, p. 288) can be as satisfactorily explained with Smith’s theory of sympathy as can the fact that the emotion of solidarity is neither egoistic nor altruistic. Secondly, the theoretical account presented above is able to explore and to analyze two particular problems of solidarity as a political emotion. It is able (1.) to render the problem of colonizing emotions visible, which is implied in the struggle of battle-solidarity, and (2.) to make us aware of the
problem of exploiting solidarity. Since the various dimensions of solidarity have no clear-cut boundaries, the emotion of solidarity can easily be transformed. The supportive dimension of solidarity can easily be used, for example, to create unifying or battle-solidarity. These problems must be taken seriously by any theory, which aims at a convincing conceptualization of solidarity as a political emotion.

References


