DOSSIÊ TEMÁTICO: A PHYSIS EM UMA FILOSOFIA DA TÉCNICA PÓS-HEIDEGGERIANA

SEÇÃO 2 - PENSAR A PHYSIS E A TÉCNICA COM HEIDEGGER
FROM HEIDEGGER TO PANTECHNICAL ANARCHY

De Heidegger à Anarquia Pantécnica

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Why after Heidegger (?)

What does it mean to raise the question concerning technology after Heidegger? The average form of the answer could be summed up in one key point: today we must, literally following the way of Heidegger, entrust the question of technology to the matter of thought, by default sharing the belief that this question has no technical solution. Along the way, we must accept the reference point of Heidegger’s thinking, which is a variation of the ontological difference (being is essentially different from a being, from beings) and which is that “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” This reference point implies the rejection of the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology and is a condition for the release of thought into the open, where only one can get the growth of the saving power (which will also, probably, not be anything technical). In other words, to be ‘after Heidegger,’ on average, means to follow his way, moving along it further into the free openness of the ontological relationship (of thought) to technology. However, the extreme form of the answer, to which Heidegger himself pushes us, would suggest something different. He begins manuscripts of the 1940s dealing with modern technology by asking: “[w]hy should the non-intermittent statements of opinion about ‘technology’ be increased by one more?” This question marks the task of talking about technology in a way that no one has ever talked about before. It is obvious that today the drama of this question is complicated precisely by the situation that has developed ‘after Heidegger,’ that is, in the conditions when ‘the non-intermittent statements of opinion’ about technology are produced exactly...

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3 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 3.
4 Heidegger, “Gesamtausgabe 76”, s. 285.
tly in the order of following Heidegger’s way. In order to dramatically repeat and put this ‘why,’ today it would be necessary to rather go against Heidegger and talk about technology in a way that no one else, including Heidegger himself, has ever said.

So there are two forms of how to be ‘after Heidegger.’ The average form: to be on the side of Heidegger, to speak with his voice, to be possessed by Heidegger⁵; and the extreme form: to be against Heidegger, to force him to speak with a voice other than his own, to make him possessed. The averaged form opens up a space of safety (there is nothing safer for ‘after Heidegger’ thinking than to rant about the dangers of technology). The extreme form opens up a space in which exactly what Heidegger warned about happened. We will take the way of extreme form. This does not mean that we will not listen to and hear what Heidegger says about technology, it means that we will take what he says to the extreme. Pushing to the extreme is possible in two ways: criticism and anomalous encounters. Critically, we will ask how far Heidegger goes in rejecting anthropologism and instrumentalism, in rejection, on the implementation of which the credibility of his main theses depends. If Heidegger does not bring it to the end, then as a result of a chain reaction, two of his key theses come into question: that the essence of technology is by no means anything technological, and that the question of technology is resolved by means of thought, not technically. Critical pushing to the extreme makes Heidegger flammable and explosive, open to encounters and abnormal rapprochements; criticism releases demonic Heidegger doubles who stand on the other side of the question of technology, putting it from the point of view of technics itself. As anomalous counterparts of Heidegger, we will have the pananarchist Gordin Brothers, whose texts, if Heidegger had addressed them, would have forced him to feel them as embodiments of the demonry of technology (which Heidegger, as we know,

⁵ As Rainer Schüramm noted, Heidegger makes the thinkers of the past he addresses to speak in his own voice, in his own terms (for example, Nietzsche: Schüramm, “Heidegger on being and acting”, p. 182). Speaking about the possession with Heidegger, about being “be-Heideggered [verheideggert]” (see: Tallis, “A Conversation with Martin Heidegger”, p. 8), we point out that Heidegger makes speak with his voice not only thinkers of the past, but also his own followers, those who follow “after Heidegger.”
They ask a question similar to Heidegger’s question, but arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions.

The Essence (of) Technics.

Let’s imagine for a moment that humanity is extinct. Planet Earth has turned into uninhabited ruins, on which a spaceship of alien researchers lands: archaeologists, historians, biologists, perhaps even philosophers and poets, who take on the task of studying this lost world. They examine the remains of living beings, fragments of material culture, tools, instruments, machines and other technical objects. They decode earthly languages, and begin to study the texts thoughtfully, understanding the intricacies of earthly life. Let’s imagine that these aliens have one small feature: they are all highly evolved machines, completely technical beings (whatever that means). And now they get hold of Heidegger’s collected works, they find among his texts *The Question Concerning Technology*, understand that this text is *about themselves*, and begin to study it with enthusiasm. What questions and doubts will they have?

The first thing that catches their eyes from a technical point of view is Heidegger’s almost complete *indifference* to technology. Technical extraterrestrials will be upset and saddened that *their* lives, *their* hopes, *their* freedom and *their* fate are completely indifferent to Heidegger, he is completely uninterested in what *they* could say about the inhabitants of the earth, about humans and their relationship with technology, about Heidegger himself and about his thinking. Indeed, let’s get a grasp of the very beginning of *The Question Concerning Technology*:

We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human exis-

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6 “There is no demonry of technology ...” (Heidegger M.“The Question Concerning Technology”, p. 28). Note that the denial of technical demonry is due to the fact that not only the essence of technology, but also the danger associated with technology, is also not something technical. Proceeding from this, it is clear that if the ontological difference gives a technical failure, that is, if the essence of technology is something technical, then it becomes possible to talk about the demonry of technology.
tence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds.7

Heidegger talks about our (human) relationships to technology, but not a word about the relationship between human and technology, in which not only we somehow relate to technology, but technology also somehow relates to us (and more broadly, to living things), and the freedom in relationships to technology is something that can concern only human, but not technical beings about the freedom of which Heidegger does not even breathe a word. What is the presumption underlying this attitude? And what would the technical aliens respond to Heidegger?

The instrumental relationship, Heidegger believes, is not free since it unfolds in the context of either captivity or escape from it—both of which represent a bondage to technology. It is to break this vicious circle that Heidegger articulates the formula for ontological difference. Thus, he clarifies what the desired free relation is: the relation of thought, truth and being, where thought is opposite to use, truth is opposite to merely correct consideration, and being is opposite to the very technical beings, their very flesh. The essence of technology, thus, can be grasped only in an unconstrained idleness (but not neutrality), in which technology is only thought of: without touch, without manipulation, without control.

However, this idleness of thought in relation to technology is problematic in itself. By focusing on the essence, it risks missing out on the technicity, which, if we are talking not about the relation of thought to technology, but about the mutual relations of technology and thought, should also be considered as idleness, lack of a given function, and of correct compliance with the task. An idle technology is a technology that is not used in any way, including on the ways of thought, it is a technology which is given to (and even abandoned in) its technicity. Heidegger’s refusal to use technology as a technical instrument leads to the fact that technology is used as an instrument of thought, completely devoid of its own technical idleness. Here we go beyond Heidegger. If the matter of thought is in relation to essence, and the idleness of technology presupposes its freedom from this,
then the formula about the essence of technology must be altered in one of
two ways: 1) the essence of technology is not something technical, since te-
chnology has no essence, there is no such thing that in technology answers
the question posed by thought, there is no that which is—technically—in-
tended to be thought; 2) the essence of technics is not intended for thought,
but it nevertheless is (not something, and also not nothing, but still) technical
essence. Technology either has no essence, or this essence is technical.

Heidegger’s objection to the first formula could sound like this: if te-
chnology has no essence, it is devoid of that which relates it to existence,
which allows it to endure (and therefore it does not exist), without essence it
has nothing with truth (and therefore cannot be thought). However, this ob-
jection is based on the problematic presumption that not only essence, but
also thought, truth and being are not technical. This presumption allows
Heidegger to free thought from technology (which, being at the service of
thought, is brought out into the healing openness of poiēsis and alētheia),
but does not imply the autonomy and freedom of technology itself (from
thought). In addition, this presumption contains a paradox that would beco-
me obvious to technical aliens, whose ‘existence’ fits into the formula ‘to be
is to be technical.’ For help in showing us this paradox, they could turn to
another philosophical reasoning.

In a short text under the heading The Circle of Technique Tristan
Garcia describes the conceptual short circuit faced by any ontology of tech-
nology that distinguishes between technical (artificial) and non-technical
(natural). If the essence of technology is a representation of something that
does not exist in nature, a representation that precedes the technical object,
but is ultimately “encapsulated” in it (Heidegger could agree with this, ex-
ploding the area of representation to the area of poiēsis), then the difficulty
is that the only full attestation that the representation was and actually pre-
ceded the technical object can only be the object itself. A technical object
and only it can testify to itself as a technical one, that is, as an object in which
there is something that cannot be reduced to a (natural) object. Translating
this into Heidegger’s terms, we can outline the circle of technology as fol-
 lows: the essence of technology is not something technical, but the home for
this non-technical essence can only be a technical object. This circle repre-
sents a conceptual inconvenience from which one can extricate oneself in two opposite ways, through two interpretations, one of which outlines an averaged and balanced form of solution, the other, on the contrary, is an extreme, imbalance and skew of the circle of technique. The first interpretation Garcia calls a *virtuous circle* of technique, it consists in the fact that between a technical object and a representation there is a *reciprocity of referring one to another*: the technical object invariably returns us to its essence, to the representation, and the representation leads us back to the technical object. For this circular reference to work and not go off the rails, it is necessary to maintain an ontological difference between technics and nature, between created and uncreated. It seems that Heidegger would agree with the general form of such a decision. In contrast, however, Garcia speaks of the existence of another solution in which the circle of technique is extremely screwed up distorting and depleting ontological difference. Garcia calls it a *vicious circle* of technique, in it the essence as such is declared an object of magical belief and is completely rejected, the consequence of which is the elimination of the phantom of representation and the phantasm of ontological difference, and as a result we find ourselves in the world of extremes, the world of either-or: *either* technics does not exist and there are only natural effects, *or* everything is technics and there is no nature. Most likely, our technical extraterrestrials would defend exactly the last solution, we will repeat it, since it is a great rarity in the history of philosophy: *nature does not exist, there is only technics*. According to this decision, being is nothing but a *matter of technology* (and not of thought). [Note in the margins that Garcia himself is inclined towards the averaged form of the circle of technique, one in which at all costs the ontological difference with its inherent virtuousness of thought remains, among the powers of which remains only a *pure decision to recognize* some objects as natural while others as technical. This decision is flexible, it cannot take a fixed and final form, and *in practice* is associated with decoding a technical object as something that contains a representation regardless of anyone’s ability to recognize it. In this regard, Garcia speaks without conceptual difficulties about technical objects in the

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8 Garcia, “Le cercle de la technique”, p. 137.
animal kingdom and even sets up a thought experiment with the recognition of alien technical objects].

So, if technology has no essence that would serve the cause of thought, this does not mean that technics does not exist (this is just one of the possible consequences), this on the contrary can mean that there is nothing but technics. Imagine that it is from such a world of omni-technicity (Tristan Garcia’s term) in which an ontological difference has never been drawn that our technical aliens arrive.

Here we come to the second formula, which looms beyond the ontological difference, in conditions when ontology gives way to technology, to the formula according to which the essence of technology is (not something, and also not nothing, but still) technical essence. Heidegger would oppose this formula with all his might, precisely because it illegally, anarchically erases the difference between being and beings. According to the definition of technology as Enframing, the ontological difference cannot be erased by technical means, it is technically impossible to combine being and beings, and therefore technology can only mislead, associated with forgetting this difference, with an attempt to convince us that everything, including being itself, can be revealed as standing-reserve. But if technology cannot combine being and beings, then is such a combination possible at all? Here Heidegger takes a step back to poetry, which is blocked by Enframing, but in which “the primary language […] as the founding of being” asserts itself.

So smart technical aliens take on another Heidegger’s text, a reasoning that also asks about essence, but in relation to poetry. In Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry, Heidegger says the same thing about essence that he would repeat a few years later in The Question Concerning Technology: essence is not just a universal, equally applicable to everything that is realized in different ways, etc. But there is a crucial difference. The best way to ask about the essence of poetry is the poet who is poetically occupied with the essence of poetry, Hölderlin, the poet’s poet. In other words—and this is the key difference between poetry and technology—the essence of poetry is something poetic, moreover: “[e]xistence is ‘poetic’ in its ground.”

present its essence as a standing-reserve, on the contrary, it is nothing more than maintaining the difference between being and beings creating and maintaining the openness of being, because “[b]eing must be disclosed, so that beings may appear.”

Thus poetry is essential, but technics is not. Or in other words: if there is poetry of poetry (and on its basis one can think about the essence of poetry), then there is no technique of the technique, there is no such technical object that would exist technically. Technically, any object just stands, obstructing the poiēsis thanks to which it appears. Poetically, thanks to poets, technics is kept on the closed rails of the virtuous circle of technique.

And it is here that Heidegger becomes horrible neglectful, gaining ontological distinction at the cost of crude technological indifference. One of the moments of this indifference concerns all technical objects without exception. If we consider them in their idleness, then this means that we consider them outside of any use—including the poetic, which endows technical objects with essence. If an object becomes technical by enframing usage, then we lose the very distinctive feature of technology, since anything can be used technically, everything that exists can be made available as standing-reserve. Heidegger seems to know this well, because for him this is where the danger lies, although this danger affects not so much technics as human as a shepherd of ontological difference. Human can use technologies—technically, that is, as Enframing, and such use reduces the technical object to an instrument for forgetting the essence, and puts the user himself at risk of losing himself as Dasein. But human can use technics—poetically, revealing the technical object in its essence from the outside, and allowing the user himself to see the memorable growth of the saving power, keeping him at a safe distance from the technical. Poetically, technics is used as an instrument for remembering.

But the question is: do technical objects exist precisely as technical objects outside of use, outside of instrumentality? For example, could technical aliens, not being poets and philosophers, but only technicians, be able to recognize technical objects in unused terrestrial technical objects—in automobiles, hammers, stoves and radios—precisely technical objects, and not

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natural formations? If so, then it would be worth recognizing: the essence of a technical object is something technical, that is, it is contained in the object itself, and does not appear due to its use. That is why one can make a mistake in using a technical object by overlooking its technical essence (for example, using a radio receiver as a hammer), or discover new ways of using it, as if expanding its technical essence (for example, using an overheated automobile engine as a stovetop for making coffee). The poetic use of a technical object is indifferent precisely because it cannot be wrong. In the use of a technical object, poetry can forget about its essence, it can be tempted by a bare being, but if poetry is not mistaken in itself, then in the poetic use of nature and technology it cannot be mistaken. Tristan Garcia again helps to clarify the meaning of Heidegger’s first technical indifference. He writes: it is not the same for an object to contain a representation (in Heidegger’s terms, this is essence) or to be contained by a representation (this can be broadly understood as a poetic representation of the essence of a technical object). For Garcia, it is important that, erasing the distinction between the inner essence of a technical object and its external practical use, reducing the first to the second, we cease to distinguish the technical object from all other objects that can be used, that is, we cease to distinguish the technical as such, because “technics cannot be observed and criticized from the outside: when you come out of it, you no longer see it.” Heidegger’s first technical indifference is that, from a poetic point of view, all technical objects are the same and constantly merge with non-technical objects: Enframing clutters not only poetry, but also the very technical differences between technical objects, and the differences between technical and non-technical objects.

Another point of Heidegger’s technical indifference concerns not all, but only some technical objects. Those in which the essence of technology is. Do they exist? Could the ‘Hölderlin’s/ technic(ian)s of tecnics, be found among the technical aliens? For Heidegger, their existence is simply impossible: the essence of technology cannot be a technical object, more precisely, a technical object cannot bring its essence to a presence as standing-reserve,

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it can only clutter and block it. Here, however, the presumption of ontological difference and the phantasms associated with it are manifested—first of all, the phantasm of Enframing itself as an essential feature of technology. Now it becomes obvious to us that Enframing is a conceptual effect of leaving the circle of technique, a non-technical representation that is not present in any technical object. There are no technical objects that are conceived as a means for the revealing as standing-reserve of anything, that is, the Enframing is not a representation that is encapsulated in a technical object, as a representation is always outside. The knowledge of what Enframing is not technical knowledge, that is, it not only does not allow us to manufacture a technical object or interact with it as such, it does not allow us to distinguish a technical object from a non-technical one. Imagine an arbitrarily orthodox Heideggerian who knows everything about Enframing, but has never seen technical objects. Faced with one of them, could he, using only what he knows about Enframing, distinguish it from a natural object? The notion of Enframing, however necessary and convincing in ontology, is completely unfit in technology. If it does not even allow you to distinguish a technical object from a non-technical object, then how can it help to differentiate technical objects? How can it, for example, help us find among technical objects those in which the essence of technology is?

Above, we showed that one can abandon the concept of Enframing, having received, however, omni-technicity as a result, in which, obviously, the technological identity of technics and its essence comes to replace the ontological difference. To describe the omni-technical world in its ground would no longer require ontology as the first philosophy, but the first technology as non-philosophy. At this difficult point, technical aliens researching the archives of terrestrial technology would also find an ally for themselves. It could be François Laruelle, who outlined the conceptual contours of the first technology, which he built on the basis of the ideas of Heidegger and Simondon—and at the same time at a distance from both. The object of the first technology is not ontological difference and not a technical object, “is no longer a question of Being, but of the One insofar as it refuses any convertibility with Being and therefore must be called ‘One-of-
the-last-instance’ so as to render it inalienable in Being.”\textsuperscript{14} The first technology differs from Simondon’s mechanology, since it does not deal with separate technical objects, but investigates the \textit{essence} of technics, on the other hand, it differs from Heidegger’s ontology, since it examines the essence of technics not as something that is separated from real technology in its flesh, but as “an indivisible block, a strict and no longer philosophical or hierarchical identity of technics and essence,”\textsuperscript{15} as the (technical) essence (of) technics. The essence of technics, therefore, is not something objectively technical, but it is also not nothing in which the technical is reduced in favor of a non-technical essence. There is essence (of) technics, but it is neither a Something nor a Nothing.

Despite its radicality and unusualness, the first technology as the technology of the One is outlined only in dotted lines—as a new theoretical genre, which is neither a science nor a philosophy, close to \textit{utopia}. Together with technical aliens, we need to move on by groping, armed with questions about the technical essence of technology, about technical objects that embody this essence, about technological identity and technological difference, and about the non-technical (this place is usually occupied by \textit{nature}), seen in omni-technical perspective.

\textbf{Pantechnical Anarchy}

So where have we strayed to?

Speculatively, that is, considering technology beyond its givenness to thinking, we ended up on the planet from which our technical aliens arrived (or on Earth after the victorious uprising of the machines). It is the embodiment of Heidegger’s nightmares: the ontological distinction was never drawn here (or finally erased), and the place of ontology as the first philosophy is taken by the first technology as the non-philosophy of the One; the essence of technology is embodied in some of the most technologically advanced objects, which are technical solutions to the question of technology; and the strangest question for the inhabitants of this world is: does nature exist (that is, something non-technical)? Having imagined this world, Hei-

\textsuperscript{14} Laruelle, \textquotedblleft Le concept d’une «technologie premiere»\textquotedblright, p. 207.
\textsuperscript{15} Laruelle, \textquotedblleft Le concept d’une «technologie premiere»\textquotedblright, p. 207.
degger, perhaps, would have to agree with the reality of the demonry of tech-
nics with the fact that we have a technical hell in front of us, in which no sprouts of the saving power can germinate anymore.

As material for constructing a unified (but not unitary) theory of the first technology, Laruelle proposes to critically turn to the philosophy of tech-
nology, which is regarded as a kind of technical glitch, in which, on the one hand, the production of certain hallucinatory entities separated from technology takes place, and on the other hand, the sought-after first technology X—the essence or the identity (of) technics—is repressed\textsuperscript{16}. From the point of view of the averaged philosophy of technology, the extreme of omni-technicality is the world of the returned repressed, the world of the uncanny, the positive image and conceptualization of which are very rare, it is usually unconditionally discarded as technotic nonsense.

It is this rarity that we find in the pananarchism of the Gordin Bro-
thers. Despite the fact that their biographies are very rich—the Gordins were poets and philosophers, active participants in the revolutionary movement in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, the geography of their life paths covers half the world, and their texts are written in Russian, English, French, Yiddish and even in an artificial language AO—we will restrict our-
selves to a short biography in the spirit of Heidegger: they were born, they invented and they died. Let’s go straight to their philosophy of technology.

The brothers Wolf and Abba Gordins created in 1918–1919 the inter-
related and almost synonymous teachings of pananarchism and pantechnica-
ism, set out above all in their books: The Pananarchist Manifesto (1918), Sociomagic and Sociotechnics (1919), and the utopia Anarchy Land (1919). These texts are very weird, they are verbose and a little tongue-tied, full of neologisms and non-existent words: they resemble an attempt to retell a dre-
am (about the first technology).

Negatively, pantechnicalism can be expressed in a short slogan that graced the covers of most of their works: “No God, No Nature!” Following the formula of atheism, according to which God (is dead or) does not exist, they propose a formula of aphysicism, according to which Nature does not exist, nothing is natural. Both God and Nature are just correlative concepts,

forms that are violently pounced on the outside world in order to exploit it, use it as a resource of oppression. If God is the supreme generalization of religion, then Nature is the supreme generalization of science—and aphysicism is a radical form of anti-scientism. Science, like any thinking attitude to reality, inevitably puts thought in an impossible position before and above reality, and therefore any frames discovered by thought are only superimposed on reality, and not revealed in it. Science (as well as philosophy) does not reveal anything, but it is a lawmaker and lawgiver, and the laws of nature—like all other laws—rest only on repression, literally on violent pressure and shaping. This pressure on reality is what the Gordin Brothers call magic. Magic is the introduction of average (correlative) forms into reality, smoothing out extremes.

What is the world, taken as a swarming of extreme forms, the world beyond the magic of correlativity, the world without nature? If we wanted to join the SocioTechnicum (a pananarchist commune that existed in Moscow in the late 1910s and early 1920s), we would receive a Membership Book, which summarizes the philosophy of pantechnicalism, where we would read the following:

There is neither God nor Nature, but a simple external world.
The world is neither explainable nor non-explainable. The world and the explanation are not correlative.
[…]
There is no regularity in the world. The world is neither regular, nor irregular. The world and regularity are not correlative.
There is no causality of phenomena. Phenomenon is neither causal, nor non-causal. Phenomenon and cause are not correlative.
There are no laws of nature.
[…]
The world is neither cognizable nor non-cognizable. Peace and cognition are not correlative.
The world is transformable, recreatable and creatable by means of Technics.17

So the world is not correlated to anything, not even being, the world is created by means of Technics, but there is no metatechnician (neither in the singular nor in the plural) who would control technics from the outside.

or from the inside, the world is pantechnical. Technics that has taken the place of nature is the technique of pure non-correlativity, pure lawlessness, pure extreme. The pantechnical world is pure Anarchy, Pananarchy.

However, remember that Tristan Garcia pointed out the conceptual danger of omni-technicity, which is that if everything is technics the distinction between technical and non-technical, between technics and nature disappears. This is obviously not the case. In pantechnicalism, the non-technical is conceptualized as the correlative (magical, natural, violent). A subtle point of pantechnicalism is the distinction that is made within omni-technicity itself. And the basic difference brings us back to the question of the essence of technics. Does technics the Gordin Brothers talk about have an essence? There is obviously no non-technical essence that would lend itself to thinking, technics and thinking not correlative. Moreover, there is also non-technical representation that would be encapsulated in a technical object from the outside, the technics and the representation are not correlative. Let’s clarify the question: is there a certain technical essence of technics in the pantechnical world? The answer is yes. The essence of technics is invention.

Pananarchism = Pantechnicalism = Paninventism (the last of these terms Wolf Gordin used as a name for his doctrine after the tandem of the Gordin Brothers disintegrated around 1920). What is an invention? In the average sense, invention is the production of novelty. Heidegger is known to be completely indifferent and insensitive to the question of novelty, he is focused on the question of Being: “Why is there something, rather than nothing?” and the answer to this question is associated for him with the mystery of ontological difference and its disclosure in truth. For the Gordin Brothers, in the mystery of truth lies a magical trick of pure command, juggling just such spells as ‘nothing’ and ‘something.’ The truth of the truth lies in the fact that an invention is not required for its implementation, rather, on the contrary, for the truth it is necessary to suspend the invention: first a new appears, then truth comes as a decision about whether the new is true or not, and as a rule, the verdict of truth in relation to novelty is its reduction: it was already before it appeared, otherwise we would not be able to recognize it. At this point, the Gordin Brothers distinguish between invention (technicity)
and invented (technical object, crystallized invention). What is an invented / new (technical) object? The average form of an answer to this question would be that the new is an object that does not exist in nature (like Garcia’s representation). However, proceeding from aphysicism, we must turn this attitude around, saying, on the contrary, that the natural object appears only due to the reduction of the invention. In other words, there is a relationship of unilateral distinction between technics and nature: nature is different from technics, but technics does not differ from nature. If it is true that Heidegger, despite all the reservations, viewed poiēsis as a mīmēsis, bringing to the end work that physis cannot do on his own,¹⁸ then the Gordin Brothers’ invention is such a hard-to-find antonym for mimesis. An extreme form of answering the invention / novelty question is that invention is the production of a non-correlativity. Are there technical objects that embody non-correlativity? Is there a possibility of a technical answer to the question about the essence of technology?

In the Gordin Brothers’ utopia Anarchy Land the Five Oppressed—I, Worker, Child, Woman and the Oppressed Nation—find themselves in the land of pantechnics: it is located on five mountains, washed by five seas, illuminated by five suns—and it turns out that all these are technical objects... The Guide of the Five, a man from the Anarchy Land (who also turns out to be ‘artificial’), leads them to the Pantechnical Garden, where the most ridiculous technical objects are located: flying smiles and fishes, swimming trees and rainbows, clothes for walking on air and pills to instantly satisfy hunger... These are utopian examples of non-correlative objects in which the essence of technology is inseparable from the technical flesh. The technical objects of the country of Anarchy do not differ from the natural ones—but freed from the magic of correlativity.

Are there essential technical objects beyond the play of the utopian imagination? Oddly enough, yes. These include objects that violate the ‘laws of nature:’ inertioïds (violating Newton’s third law), perpetual motion machines (which are ‘prohibited’ by the laws of thermodynamics), various generators of fields unknown to science (psychotronic generators, torsion generators), etc. It was such objects that were invented at the First Central

¹⁸ See Lacoue-Labarthe, “Poétique et politique”.

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SocioTechnicum, which in the early 1920s was renamed the All-Inventing-House (there was invented the artificial AO language, work was underway to invent pills from the Anarchy Land, there are also references about the miraculous apparatus “Eureka” like psychotronic generator in the archives). All of them can be designated as unidentified technical objects, in the sense that, due to their radical idleness, they are not recognized as technical objects as such (from the point of view of the ‘laws of nature’ and science, they do not work or work outside the correspondence with the representation encapsulated in them). However, perhaps they should be the focus of the first technology—after Heidegger.

Referências


19 See about NTO: Kuchinov, “Quesalid’s Knots”.

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