Os limites da afectividade (e um coda sobre a consciência estendida)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.256751Palavras-chave:
filosofia da mente e ciência cognitiva, mente estendida e cognição situada, afectividade situada, afectividade estendida, consciência estendidaResumo
Nesta contribuição vou oferecer um guia rudimentar através da "afectividade situada", uma pequena galáxia de teorias, ideias, intuições que estão recentemente a crescer nas fronteiras entre filosofia da emoção, filosofia da mente, filosofia da ciência cognitiva. Nos últimos anos, estamos a assistir a uma verdadeira "viragem afectiva" no domínio da filosofia analítica da mente e da ciência cognitiva, e a afectividade situada é um excelente exemplo do que se está se passando nesse campo. Na primeira parte, apresentarei as principais versões da afectividade situada, distinguindo entre as ideias de emoções situadas ou andaimes (Griffiths, Scarantino 2009; Colombetti,Krueger 2015) e as emoções devidamente prolongadas (Carter et al. 2016; Colombetti, Roberts 2015), e mostrando a sua ligação à ideia correspondente da mente: andaimes, prolongados ou não. Na segunda parte, explorarei melhor a ligação entre a afectividade situada e o domínio da mente estendida: Argumentarei que, mesmo que a afectividade situada pudesse, em princípio, ser avaliada independentemente de qualquer teoria particular sobre a mente, lidar com a afectividade situada é, para além do seu interesse independente, também uma boa forma de lidar com um problema inseguro na literatura sobre a mente estendida, nomeadamente a consciência estendida.
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