Abordagens para o blushing: questões de contexto

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.256756

Palavras-chave:

blushing, contexto social, expressão emocional, teoria básica da emoção, teoria contextual da emoção

Resumo

Este artigo oferece um tratamento sistemático do contexto social e cultural do blush. O documento examina como diferentes teorias emocionais abordam o rubor e o faz diferenciando entre teorias emocionais básicas, que consideram fatores contextuais mas não os tornam centrais para a compreensão das expressões emocionais, e teorias emocionais contextuais, que tornam fatores contextuais centrais para a compreensão das expressões emocionais. O texto argumenta que o rubor pode ser melhor explicado por teorias que tornam o contexto central para a compreensão das expressões emocionais.

Biografia do Autor

Gen Eickers, University of Bayreuth Germany

Gen Eickers is a Postdoc/Assistant Professor at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. After finishing their PhD in philosophy in 2019 at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Freie Universität Berlin, they continue to work at the intersections of philosophy of mind, social epistemology, and social psychology. Specifically, their research addresses questions around social interaction, emotion, social norms, and gender

Referências

AHN, H. K.; KIM, H. J.; AGGARWAL, P. Helping fellow beings: Anthropomorphized social causes and the role of anticipatory guilt. Psychological science, v. 25, n. 1, p. 224-229, 2014.

AIRENTI, G. The cognitive bases of anthropomorphism: from relatedness to empathy. International Journal of Social Robotics, v. 7, n. 1, p. 117-127, 2015.

AIRENTI, G. The development of anthropomorphism in interaction: Intersubjectivity, imagination, and theory of mind. Frontiers in psychology, v. 9, p. 2136, 2018.

BEALER, G. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.” In: DEPAUL, M; RAMSEY, W. (Eds.). Rethinking Intuition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 201 – 240, 1998.

BICKLE, J. Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?. Synthese, v. 177, n. 2, p.247-260, 2010.

BICKLE, J. Multiple realizability. Encyclopedia of cognitive science, 2006.

BICKLE, J. Multiple Realizability. In: ZALTA, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020. Disponível em:.

BLOCK, N. Are absent qualia impossible?. Philosophical Review, v.89, n.2, p.257-274, 1980.

BLOCK, N. Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers. Bradford, 2007.

BLOCK, N. Troubles with Functionalism. In: Goldman, A. (Ed.). Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 261- 325, 1978.

BLOCK, N.; FODOR, J. What psychological states are not. Readings in philosophy of psychology, v. 1, p. 237-250, 1980.

BLOOM, P. Just babies: The origins of good and evil. Broadway Books, 2013.

BUTTERFIELD, M. E.; HILL, S. E.; LORD, C. G. Mangy mutt or furry friend? Anthropomorphism promotes animal welfare. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, v. 48, n. 4, p. 957-960, 2012.

CARNIELLI, W.; CONIGLIO, M. Lógic∀ ∃xiste para todos: um mínimo de lógica e argumentação. Notas de aula, 2006.

CHALMERS, A. F.; FIKER, R. (Trad.). O que é ciência afinal? São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1993.

Chalmers, D. J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, 1996.

COWELL, J. M.; DECETY, J. The neuroscience of implicit moral evaluation and its relation to generosity in early childhood. Current Biology, v. 25, n.1, p. 93–97, 2015.

EDDY, T. J.; GALLUP, G. G.; POVINELLI, D. J. Attribution of cognitive states to animals: Anthropomorphism in comparative perspective. Journal of Social issues, v. 49, p. 87-87, 1993.

EPLEY, N.; WAYTZ, A.; CACIOPPO, J. T. On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological review, v. 114, n. 4, p. 864, 2007.

GANEA, P. A.; CANFIELD, C. F.; SIMONS-GHAFARI, K.; CHOU, T. Do cavies talk? The effect of anthropomorphic picture books on children's knowledge about animals. Frontiers in psychology, v. 5, n. 283, 2014.

GENDLER, T. S. Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium. Midwest studies in philosophy, v. 31, p. 68-89, 2007.

GERGELY, G.; NÁDASDY, Z.; CSIBRA, G.; BÍRÓ, S. Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Elsevier, Cognition, v. 56, n. 2, 1995, p.165-93.

GOLD, J. M.; MUNDY, P. J.; TJAN, B. S. The perception of a face is no more than the sum of its parts. Psychological science, v. 23, n. 4, p. 427-434, 2012.

GOLDMAN, A. 2007. Philosophical Intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, v. 74, n. 1, p.1- 26.

HAMLIN, J. K. The case for social evaluation in preverbal infants: gazing toward. one’s goal drives infants’ preferences for Helpers over Hinderers in the hill paradigm. Frontiers in psychology, v. 5, 2015. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01563.

HAMLIN, J. K.; WYNN, K.; BLOOM, P. Social evaluation by preverbal infants. Nature 450, p. 557–559, 2007. doi:10.1038/nature06288.

HAMLIN, J. K.; WYNN, K.; BLOOM, P. The case for social evaluation in infants. Em resposta a: SCARF, D.; IMUTA, K.; COLOMBO, M.; HAYNE, H. Social Evaluation or Simple Association? Simple Associations May Explain Moral Reasoning in infants. PLoS ONE, v.7, n. 8, 2012, p.e42698. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042698.

HEIDER, F. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, New York: Wiley, 1958.

HEIDER, F.; SIMMEL, M. An experimental study of apparent behavior. The American Journal of Psychology, v. 57, 1944, p. 243–259. https://doi.org/10.2307/1416950.

HEIL, J. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3. ed. New York: Routledge, 2013.

HUEBNER, B; BRUNO, M.; SARKISSIAN, H. What does the nation of China think about. phenomenal states?. Review of philosophy and psychology, v. 1, n. 2, p. 225-243, 2010.

HUEMER, M. Moral Intuitionism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

HUEMER, M. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman e Littlefield, 2001.

LARSEN, N. E.; LEE, K.; GANEA, P. A. Do storybooks with anthropomorphized animal. characters promote prosocial behaviors in young children?. Developmental Science, v. 21, n. 3, p. e12590, 2018.

LEVIN, J. Functionalism. In: ZALTA, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018 Disponível em: .

LEWIS, D. Philosophical Papers Volume I. New York: Oxford university press, 1983.

LIBERTUS, K.; LANDA, R. J.; HAWORTH, J. L. Development of attention to faces during the first 3 years: Influences of stimulus type. Frontiers in psychology, v. 8, p. 1976, 2017.

LYCAN, W. Representational Theories of Consciousness, In: ZALTA, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019. Disponível em: .

MELTZOFF, A. N.; BROOKS, R.; SHON, A. P.; RAO, R. P. “Social” robots are psychological agents for infants: A test of gaze following. Neural networks, v. 23, n. 8-9, p. 966-972, 2010.

MORTARI, C. A. Introdução à lógica. 2. ed. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2016.

NIGHBOR, T.; KOHN, C.; NORMAND, M.; SCHLINGER, H. Stability of infants’ preference for prosocial others: Implications for research based on single-choice paradigms. PLoS One, v. 12, n. 6, p.e0178818, 2017. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0178818.

OATLEY, K.; YUILL, N. Perception of personal and interpersonal action in a cartoon film.British journal of social psychology, v. 24, n. 2, p. 115-124, 1985.

PAUTZ, A.; STOLJAR, D. (Ed.). Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. New York: MIT Press, 2019.

PITCHER, D.; WALSH, V.; DUCHAINE, B. The role of the occipital face area in the cortical face perception network. Experimental brain research, v. 209, n. 4, p. 481-493, 2011.

PUST, J. Intuition, In: ZALTA, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019. Disponível em: .

PUST, J. Intuitions as Evidence. New York: Garland Press, 2000.

PUTNAM, H. Representation and reality. MIT press, 1988.

PUTNAM, H. The Nature of Mental States. Readings in philosophy of psychology, v. 1, p. 223-231, 1980.

RAVENSCROFT, I. Folk Psychology as a Theory. In: ZALTA, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019. Disponível em: .

SALVADORI, E.; BLAZSEKOVA, T.; VOLEIN, A.; KARAP, Z.; TATONE, D.; MASCARO, O.; CSIBRA, G. Probing the strength of infants’ preference for helpers over hinderers: two replication attempts of Hamlin and Wynn (2011). PLoS One, v. 10, v.11, p. e0140570, 2015. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0140570.

SCARF, D.; IMUTA, K.; COLOMBO, M.; HAYNE, H. Social Evaluation or Simple Association? Simple Associations May Explain Moral Reasoning in infants. PLoS ONE, v.7, n. 8, 2012, p. e42698. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042698.

SCHROLL, R.; SCHNURR, B.; GREWAL, D. Humanizing products with handwritten typefaces. Journal of Consumer Research, v. 45, n. 3, p.648-672, 2018.

SHAGRIR, O. The rise and fall of computational functionalism. In: BEN-MENAHEM, Yemima (Ed.). Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press, p. 220-250, 2005.

SELLARS, W. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 1, n. 19, p.253–329, 1956.

SOSA, E. Intuitions: their nature and epistemic efficacy. Grazer Philosophische Studien, v. 74, n. 1, p. 51-67, 2007.

STICH, S. P.; NICHOLS, S. Folk Psychology. In: STICH, S. P.; WARFIELD, T.A. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 235–55.

TAM, K. P. Anthropomorphism of nature and efficacy in coping with the environmental crisis. Social Cognition, v. 32, n. 3, p. 276-296, 2014.

TAM, K. P.; LEE, S. L.; CHAO, M. M. Saving Mr. Nature: Anthropomorphism enhances connectedness to and protectiveness toward nature. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, v. 49, n. 3, p. 514-521, 2013.

TRIANTOS, A.; PLAKOYIANNAKI, E.; OUTRA, E.; PETRIDIS, N. Anthropomorphic packaging: is there life on “Mars”?. European Journal of Marketing, 2016.

WAN, E.; CHEN, R. P. Anthropomorphism and object attachment. Current Opinion in Psychology, v. 39, s.n., p. 1-6, 2021.

WELLMAN, H. M. Making Minds: How theory of mind develops, oxford series in cognitive development. Oxford University Press, 2014.

WILLIAMSON, T. Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, v. 105, p. 1–23, 2005.

WILLIAMSON, T. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing. Wiley-Blackwell, 2007.

YANG, L. W.; AGGARWAL, P; MCGILL, A. L. The 3 C's of anthropomorphism: Connection, comprehension, and competition. Consumer Psychology Review, v. 3, n. 1, p. 3-19, 2019.

ZAJONC, R. B. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, v. 35, n. 2, p. 151, 1980.

ZHOU, X.; KIM, S.; WANG, L. Money helps when money feels: Money anthropomorphism increases charitable giving. Journal of Consumer Research, v. 45, n. 5, p. 953-972, 2019.

ZHU, H.; WONG, N.; HUANG, M. Does relationship matter? How social distance influences perceptions of responsibility on anthropomorphized environmental objects and conservation intentions. Journal of Business Research, v. 95, p. 62-70, 2019.

Downloads

Publicado

2022-12-12

Edição

v. 49 n. 5 (2022): Fenomenologia, Ação, Cognição, Afetividade

Seção

Dossiê “Fenomenologia, Ação, Cognição e Afetividade”

Licença

A Revista Perspectiva Filosófica orienta seus procedimentos de gestão de artigos conforme as diretrizes básicas formuladas pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). http://www.cnpq.br/web/guest/diretrizes

Autores que publicam nesta revista concordam com os seguintes termos:

  1. Os autores mantém os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, sendo o trabalho simultaneamente licenciado sob https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.pt_BR que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista.

  2. Os autores têm autorização para assumir contratos adicionais separadamente, para distribuição não-exclusiva da versão do trabalho publicada nesta revista, com reconhecimento de autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista (Consultar http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html).

Licença Creative Commons
Esta revista está licenciada com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.