Sentimentos existenciais e ruptura psiquiátrica

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.256762

Palavras-chave:

fenomenologia, afetividade, sentimentos existenciais, filosofia da psiquiatria

Resumo

Neste trabalho, procuro apresentar as linhas gerais da discussão sobre o conceito de sentimentos existenciais recentemente desenvolvido por Matthew Ratcliffe. Meu objetivo principal consiste, primeiro, no exame do conceito, levando em consideração seus antecedentes históricos e elementos internos. Após apresentar o modo como essa dimensão afetiva resiste à tradicional dicotomia corpo/cognição na filosofia da emoção clássica, chamo a atenção para o seu traço inconspícuo e sua função estruturante de nossa vida intencional. Se, por um lado, esses sentimentos encerram elementos corporais passíveis de identificação e descrição, por outro, somente a interrupção de seu funcionamento adequado evidencia a função estruturante por eles desempenhada. O desenrolar de uma experiência comum, sua “normalidade”, portanto, depende de um nível de habitualidade no qual esses sentimentos não estão manifestos. São os casos de ruptura e colapso que apresentam os elementos requeridos para o acesso adequado a essa dimensão tácita de nossa experiência. Ao contrastar dois modos possíveis de acesso a essa dimensão estrutural, sugiro que algumas desordens psiquiátricas apresentam os elementos de interrupção e ruptura necessários para um acesso adequado a essa dimensão afetivo-estrutural. São destacadas ainda as implicações dessa noção para uma psiquiatria fenomenologicamente informada.

Biografia do Autor

Marcelo Vieira Lopes, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)

Marcelo Vieira Lopes desenvolve pesquisa em nível de doutorado no PPG-Fil da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), na área de Fenomenologia e compreensão, com foco específico na interação entre Fenomenologia, Filosofia da Emoção e Filosofia da Psiquiatria. Atualmente, cumpre o período de doutorado sanduíche no Departamento de Filosofia da Freie Universität Berlin, sob orientação do Prof. Jan Slaby.

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Publicado

2022-12-12

Edição

v. 49 n. 5 (2022): Fenomenologia, Ação, Cognição, Afetividade

Seção

Dossiê “Fenomenologia, Ação, Cognição e Afetividade”

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