Desacordo e a semântica de termos normativos e avaliativos
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266962Palavras-chave:
desacordo, ética conceitual, negociação metalinguísticResumo
Argumentamos que muitas divergências sobre a ética conceitual não são expressas explicitamente. As negociações metalinguísticas são as instâncias mais importantes desse tipo implícito ou tácito. À primeira vista, essas disputas podem não parecer - nem para os próprios falantes nem para o teórico - refletir discordâncias sobre a escolha do conceito. Mas, de fato, elas refletem discordâncias sobre a escolha de conceitos. Muitas disputas que os teóricos pensaram que deveriam ser analisadas em termos do conteúdo literal compartilhado são, portanto, melhor analisadas como falantes que usam suas palavras de maneiras diferentes, defendendo (metalinguisticamente) seu uso preferido.
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