Um método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266963Palavras-chave:
metafísica, trabalho conceitual, engenharia conceitualResumo
Este artigo apresenta um método pragmático para o trabalho conceitual normativo em metafísica. Argumenta-se que a metafísica envolve tarefas conceituais descritivas e normativas, concentrando-se em como estas últimas devem ser conduzidas. Ao contrastar uma “abordagem metafísica” com uma “abordagem pragmática” alinhada com o deflacionismo metaontológico, a autora aborda preocupações sobre o abandono da metafísica tradicional.
O núcleo do método pragmático está na compreensão dos conceitos pela sua função. Essa visão orientada pela função permite explicar intuições sobre a estrutura do mundo, garantindo escolhas conceituais não arbitrárias e fornecendo uma base para a crítica, tudo isso sem depender de fatos metafísicos.
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