Resistir e Sobreviver: Estratégia e Coordenação Eleitoral na Federação Russa

Autores

  • Matheus Cavalcanti Pestana

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/1808-8708.2023.260631

Palavras-chave:

Partidos, Eleições, Autocracia, Oposição

Resumo

Por que, em regimes classificados como autocráticos, onde frequentemente existem suspeitas de manipulação e viés no processo eleitoral, partidos que não estão alinhados com o regime ainda decidem competir? A questão é intrigan- te e forma a base do presente trabalho, que se concentra na análise dos dados eleitorais da Federação Russa. O foco é entender a dinâmica da oposição em um regime autocrático, especificamente o regime russo dominado pelo “partido do poder” Rússia Unida, que regularmente ganha eleições com margens significativas de vitória. A pesquisa procura desvendar o raciocínio subjacente que leva a oposição partidária a considerar válida a continuação da participação nos pleitos eleitorais, mesmo quando as chances de vitória parecem distantes ou até inexistentes no momento atual. Contrariando a hipótese de que possa existir um acordo implícito entre a oposição e o regime, uma espécie de “opo- sição consentida”, os resultados preliminares apontam para uma verdadeira dedicação e estratégia dos partidos na competição eleitoral. Parece que eles não estão simplesmente cumprindo um papel; em vez disso, estão ativamente buscando ampliar seu apoio a longo prazo e de maneira localizada. A descoberta sugere que a situação é mais com- plexa do que pode parecer à primeira vista, e que a oposição em regimes autocráticos pode estar operando com uma lógica própria, orientada para o futuro e focada em ganhos incrementais. Esse entendimento pode ter implicações significativas para a nossa compreensão da natureza da política em regimes autocráticos e da resistência e resiliência da oposição sob condições aparentemente desfavoráveis.

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Publicado

2023-12-12

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