Limites da Fenomenologia da Empatia na Cognição Social

Daniel De Luca-Noronha

Resumo


Resumo: O debate contemporâneo sobre a cognição social tem sido marcado pela retomada da abordagem fenomenológica da empatia. Essa abordagem postula uma experiência perceptual direta com outras mentes, ao menos em situações típicas de interação. Meu objetivo neste artigo é investigar o alcance dessa tese. Tentarei mostrar que este alcance é mais limitado do que os proponentes da empatia estariam dispostos a aceitar. Ainda que haja uma experiência perceptual direta com outras mentes, essa experiência não envolve um grau de flexibilidade suficiente para o que é requerido em situações ordinárias de coordenação de ação, precisamente aquelas situações focadas pela abordagem fenomenológica. Esse problema poderá oferecer a ocasião de uma exploração futura sobre o papel de capacidades inferenciais em tais situações.

Palavras-Chave: Cognição Social; Percepção; Fenomenologia; Flexibilidade.

 


Abstract: The contemporary debate about social cognition has been marked by the resurgence of the phenomenological approach of empathy. This approach argues for a direct perceptual experience with other minds, at least in typical situations of interaction. My aim in this paper is to investigate the scope of this claim. I argue that its scope is more limited than the proponents of empathy would be willing to accept. Even if there is such a thing as direct perceptual experience with other minds, this experience does not involve as much flexibility as it is required in ordinary situations of coordination of actions, which are precisely the situations emphasized by the phenomenological approach. This problem might pave the way for further investigations on the role of inferential capabilities in such situations.

Keywords: Social Cognition; Perception; Phenomenology; Flexibility.


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Referências


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.19134/eutomia-v1i15p177-198




DOI: https://doi.org/10.19134/eutomia-v1i15p177-198

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