Chisholm’s modal paradox: two approaches examined

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2021.246320

Keywords:

Chisholm’s paradox, modality, many-valued logic, transworld identity

Abstract

This paper is organized in the following way: the first section puts forward the version of Chisholm’s Modal Paradox that is going to be taken into consideration. The presentation of the paradox is followed by two sections where two invalidating strategies (as I call them) are presented;  the second section presents Forbes’ strategy for dealing with the paradox. As part of the second section, it is presented Forbes’ many-valued semantics for modal logic. The third section is a presentation of Salmon’s strategy to solve the paradox. The fourth and last section is reserved for critical comments concerning both approaches. Those comments are to be understood as motivations against each strategy not as definitive refutation of either of them.  I finish the paper concluding that Salmon’s strategy seems to be the most conservative invalidating strategy.

Author Biography

Fernando Fabricio Rodrigues Furtado, University of Lisbon ; Centro Federal de Educação Tecnológica de Minas Gerais

PhD candidate in Philosophy at University of Lisbon

Professor of Philosophy at CEFET-MG

References

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Published

2021-04-11

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Section

Dossiê temático dedicado à Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana