Chisholm’s modal paradox: two approaches examined

Auteurs

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2021.246320

Mots-clés :

Chisholm’s paradox, modality, many-valued logic, transworld identity

Résumé

This paper is organized in the following way: the first section puts forward the version of Chisholm’s Modal Paradox that is going to be taken into consideration. The presentation of the paradox is followed by two sections where two invalidating strategies (as I call them) are presented;  the second section presents Forbes’ strategy for dealing with the paradox. As part of the second section, it is presented Forbes’ many-valued semantics for modal logic. The third section is a presentation of Salmon’s strategy to solve the paradox. The fourth and last section is reserved for critical comments concerning both approaches. Those comments are to be understood as motivations against each strategy not as definitive refutation of either of them.  I finish the paper concluding that Salmon’s strategy seems to be the most conservative invalidating strategy.

Biographie de l'auteur

Fernando Fabricio Rodrigues Furtado, University of Lisbon ; Centro Federal de Educação Tecnológica de Minas Gerais

PhD candidate in Philosophy at University of Lisbon

Professor of Philosophy at CEFET-MG

Références

CHANDLER, H. Plantinga and the Contingently Possible. Analysis, 36, pp.106-109, 1976.

CHISHOLM, R. Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Noûs,1(1), pp. 01-08, 1967.

CHISHOLM, R. Parts as Essential to Their Wholes. The Review of Meta-physics, 26(04), pp. 581-603, 1973.

FARA, D. G. Possibility Relative to a Sortal. In K. Bennett, & D. W. Zim-merman (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Vol. 07, pp. 3-40). Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press, 2012.

FORBES, G. Two Solutions to Chisholm’s Paradox. Philosophical Studies,46, pp. 171-187, 1984.

KRIPKE, S. Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta PhilosophicaFennica, 13, pp. 83-94, 1963.

KRIPKE, S. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.

LESLIE, S. Essence, Plenitude and Paradox. In J. Hawthorn (Ed.), Philo-sophical Perpectives: Metaphysics (Vol. 25, pp. 277-296). Wiley, 2011.

MACKIE, P., & JAGO, M. Transword Identity. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) The Stan-ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013.

QUINE, W. V. Worlds Away. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, pp. 859-863,1976.

ROBERTSON, T. Modal Paradox. In J. Berg (Ed.), Naming, Necessity, andMore (pp. 54-80). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

ROCA-ROYES, S. Rethinking Origin Essentialism (for artefacts). In M.Jago (Ed.), Reality Making. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016.

SALMON, N. How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Refer-ence. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(12), pp. 703-725, 1979.

SALMON, N. Reference and Essence (2 ed.). Amherst: Prometheus Books,1981.

SALMON, N. Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparrts, Points and Counter-points. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest Sudies inPhilosophy: Studies in Essencialism (Vol. XI, pp. 75-120). Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

SALMON N. The Logic of What Might Have Been. Philosophical Review,pp. 3-34, 1989.

WILLIAMSON, T. Identity and Descrimination. Oxford, UK: Basil Black-well, 1990.

Téléchargements

Publiée

2021-04-11

Numéro

Vol. 48 No 1 (2021): Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

Rubrique

Dossiê temático dedicado à Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

Licence

© Fernando Fabricio Rodrigues Furtado 2021

Creative Commons License

Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions 4.0 International.

A Revista Perspectiva Filosófica orienta seus procedimentos de gestão de artigos conforme as diretrizes básicas formuladas pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). http://memoria2.cnpq.br/web/guest/diretrizes/

Autores que publicam nesta revista concordam com os seguintes termos:

  1. Os autores mantém os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, sendo o trabalho simultaneamente licenciado sob Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista.

  2. Os autores têm autorização para assumir contratos adicionais separadamente, para distribuição não-exclusiva da versão do trabalho publicada nesta revista, com reconhecimento de autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista (Consultar http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html).

Licença Creative Commons
As obras publicadas pela Revista Perspectiva Filosófica estão licenciadas com Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.