The reverse image of observation

Authors

  • Alessio Gava Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Keywords:

Van Fraassen, observation, observability, constructive empiricism, Hume’s problem

Abstract

The problem of the justification of inductive inferences, also known as ‘Hume’s problem’, seems to have lost strength since the early 20th century, following several authors’ denial that induction is the method of science. Van Fraassen went beyond this denial and recently stated that induction does not exist. It is our aim to show that, in order to bring forward a coherent vision of science, in his reconstruction it is the observable (a crucial term for his Constructive Empiricism) that is logically prior to the act of observing and not the other way round. We called this ‘the reverse image of observation’.

Author Biography

Alessio Gava, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Doutorando em Lógica e Filosofia da Ciência - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

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Published

2014-04-23