The assertion debate
an introductory presentation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2023.258487Keywords:
assertion, speech acts, epistemic norms, assertion normsAbstract
In this paper I will do an introductory presentation of the assertion debate. First I’ll show the assertion as a speech act type through classics speech act theories. Second, I’ll show a variety of attempts, in philosophy of language and epistemology, to find the defining elements of the assertion and I close by presenting the four most prominent theories of assertion.
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