The open-endedness objection against sophisticated dispositionalism

Authors

  • Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho King's College London

Abstract

Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by sophisticated dispositionalism is not viable. My goal in this paper is to argue that the open-endedness objection is flawed.

Author Biography

Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho, King's College London

Doutorando em Filosofia pelo King’s College London. Mestre em Filosofia pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Lógica e Metafísica (PPGLM) da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ).

References

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BOGHOSSIAN, P. Naturalizing Content. In G. Rey and B. Loewer (eds.) Meaning inMind, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 65–86, 1990.

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MILLER, A.Does 'Belief-Holism' Show That Reductive Dispositionalism About ContentCould Not Be True?Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 77, pp. 73-90, 2003.

Published

2015-12-15