How to save van Fraassen’s own antirealism: a modest proposal

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2018.241532

Keywords:

antirealism, constructive empiricism, observability, realism, van Fraassen

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen’s antirealist view of science and its aim, constructive empiricism, notoriously rests upon a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. In order to back his empiricist stance, the Dutch philosopher put forward his own characterization of observability. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the point of constructive empiricism is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way from how he draws it. This means that other characterizations of observability can support this antirealist stance, provided they allow for a viable distinction between the observable and the unobservable. The aim of this work, however, is not to propose another characterization of observability that fits constructive empiricism, but to put forward a little amendment to van Fraassen’s own antirealism, to the effect that it can actually be seen as a coherent position, albeit controversial, since its present consistency might be called into question.

Author Biography

Alessio Gava, Universidade Estadual do Paraná, Apucarana

Mestre e Doutor em Lógica e Filosofia da Ciência pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - UFMG; formado em Física pela "Università degli Studi di Trieste" (Itália); professor de matemática junto à Universidade Estadual do Paraná - Campus de Apucarana.

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Published

2020-02-17