Vícios intelectuais, motivação e responsabilidade

Authors

  • Bruno Tenório Coelho Universidade Federal da Bahia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.247947

Keywords:

intellectual vices, vice epistemology, motivation, responsibility

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for pluralism about intellectual vices. In the first section, I present obstructionism, that defines intellectual vices as obstacles that prevent or limit the acquisition of knowledge. Next, I describe A. Tanesini's (2019) proposal, who argues that intellectual vices result from a non-instrumental motivation to oppose epistemic goods. I argue that Tanesini's reductive approach is unsuccessful. There are cases of intellectual vices that are not the result of bad motivation. After presenting and discussing obstructionism and the motivational approach, I consider a recent concern, according to which there is a problem of responsibility in vice epistemology.

References

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Published

2020-08-19

Issue

Vol. 46 No. 1 (2019): Epistemologia Contemporânea - Primeira Parte: Questões de Epistemologia Analítica

Section

Dossiê de Epistemologia Contemporânea

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