John Rawls, overlay consensus and reasonable pluralism: criticists of Chantal Mouffe

Abstract

For Mouffe, Rawls finds himself in a circular form of argument, because at the same time that political liberalism claims to provide a consensus among reasonable plural people, such people have to accept its principles. However, the author of The Return to the Political agrees with Rawls when he maintains that in a modern democracy the principles of justice cannot be derived from philosophical, religious and moral conceptions. On the other hand, she disagrees with the Rawlsian theory, because the defense of this thesis is inadequate. In Rawls there is an attempt to make the political disappear as a conflict of the domain of the conquest of power. Thus, thinking the politician in terms of moral language, as Rawlsian theory does, necessarily, leads to neglecting the role of conflict, power and interests. However, justice as equity, no moment, inhibits differences. Using reflective equilibrium, Rawls elaborates, in his theory, a mutual adjustment, through an argumentative reasonable process of the most diverse conceptions of good.