Integration of Galliers' increased coherence model into the Evans-Araújo modeling of Robert Brandom's game of give and take reasons
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248947Keywords:
belief revision, AGM paradigm, Robert Brandom, increased coherence model, game of giving and asking for reasons, nonmonotonic reasoningAbstract
The objective of this article is to reevaluate a formalization of Brandom’s (1998) game of giving and asking for reasons proposed by me in (HECK, 2018), which separates it into two instances: an individual that can be turned into public performances and another which is effectively historical-public; proposing corrections to the first of these instances. Namely, replacing the formalization in database and static operations, elaborated by Araújo (2018), by the formal expression of a dynamic cognitive and communicative activity given by Galliers (1992) called ICM (increased coherence model) from the AGM paradigm (1988). To accomplish this, I begin by presenting Brandom's thinking and his conception of giving and asking for reasons, with their un-derlying dynamics. Then I present a formalization which combines the public instance of Evans (2018) with the personal instance of Araújo. From there, some criticisms being cast, with special focus on the unjustified and static character of operations on the doxastic states of Araújo's model. Finally, I present Galliers' modeling as a solution to these criticisms, concluding that this incursion of modeling revision adds pragmatic elements to operations on beliefs, although, being only the beginning of necessary revisions to provide a satisfactory logical expression of the dynamic and inconsistent activity that is the game of giving and asking for reasons.
References
ALCHOURRÓN, C. E.; GÄRDENFORS, P.; MAKINSON, D. “On theLogic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”.In: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 50, No. 2. New York: Association forSymbolic Logic, 1985. pp. 510-530.
ARAÚJO, A. B. de. “Semantic Information and Artificial Intelligence”. In:MÜLLER, Vincent C. (Ed.). Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Ox-ford: Springer, 2016. p.129-140.
BÉZIAU, J.-Y.; CARNIELLI, W.; GABBAY, D. (Eds) Handbook of Para-consistency. London: College Publications, 2007.
BRANDOM, Robert B. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferencial-ism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
BRANDOM, Robert B. Making it Explicit:Reasoning, Representing and Discur-sive Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
BREWKA, G. Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundation of Commom-sense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
DARWICHE, A.; PEARL, J. “On the logic of iterated belief revision”. In:Artificial Intelligence. Volume 89, No.1-2, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997. pp.1-29.D
DELGRANDE, J.P.; PEPPAS, P. “Revising Horn Theories”. In: Proceedingsof the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.Barcelona: AAAI Press, 2011. pp.839-844.
DELGRANDE, J.P. “Belief revision in Horn theories”. In: Artificial Intelligence.No.218, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2014. pp.1-22.
EVANS, R. P. “Computer Models of Constitutive Social Practice”. In:MÜLLER, V. C. (Ed.) Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford:Springer, 2016. [Cap. 23] pp.391-411.
GALLIERS, J. R. “Autonomous Belief Revision and Comunication”. In: Be-lief Revision. GÄRDENFORS, P. (Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1992. pp.220-246.
GÄRDENFORS, P. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of EpistemicStates. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988.
GÄRDENFORS, P. “The Dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations vs Co-herence Theories”. In: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 172. pp.24-46.
GÄRDENFORS, P. Belief Revision: “An Introduction”. In: Belief Revision.GÄRDENFORS, P. (Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.pp.1-28.
HECK, R. L. Informação a Partir de Regras: Considerações para a Solução doEscândalo da Dedução pela Semântica Inferencial Pragmática. Tese (Doutora-do em Filosofia) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.
HUHNS, M. N; SINGH, M. P. “Cognitive Agents”. In: IEEE Internet Comput-ing, 1998. pp.87-89.
LEWIS, D. “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”. In: Journal of PhilosophicalLogic [1979] Vol. 8, No.3, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub., 2004. pp.339-359.
NEBEL, B. “Syntax Based Approaches to belief revision”. In: Belief Revision.GÄRDENFORS, P. (Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.pp.52-88.
PEPPAS, P. “Belief revision”. In: VAN HARMELEN, F.; VLADIMIR, L.;PORTER, B.Handbook of Knowledge Representation, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2008. pp.317–359.
SELLARS, W. “Inference and Meaning”. In: Mind. Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press,1953. Vol. 62, No. 247. pp. 313-338.
SELLARS, W. “Some Reflections on Language Games”. In: Philosophy of Science. Vol. 21, No. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. pp. 204-228.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations [1953] (4th ed.). Oxford:Blackwell, 2009.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
A Revista Perspectiva Filosófica orienta seus procedimentos de gestão de artigos conforme as diretrizes básicas formuladas pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). http://memoria2.cnpq.br/web/guest/diretrizes/
Autores que publicam nesta revista concordam com os seguintes termos:
-
Os autores mantém os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, sendo o trabalho simultaneamente licenciado sob Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista.
-
Os autores têm autorização para assumir contratos adicionais separadamente, para distribuição não-exclusiva da versão do trabalho publicada nesta revista, com reconhecimento de autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista (Consultar http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html).
As obras publicadas pela Revista Perspectiva Filosófica estão licenciadas com Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.
