Anti-exceptionalism and the methodology of logic
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248948Keywords:
anti-exceptionalism about logic, logical abductivism, reflexive equilibrium, methodology of logicAbstract
A recent trend in the philosophy of logic, which is usually called “anti-excep-tionalism about logic”, proposes that logical principles are not justified by a priori intuitions, but rather, like in other sciences, by a posteriori or empirical evidence. The current essay presents the variety of anti-exceptionalism at-tributed to Quine, as well as two more recent proposals for the method of re-vision of logical theories, namely, abduction and reflexive equilibrium. Fi-nally, the background logic problem is addressed, which puts into question the possibility of there being an anti-exceptional method of theory revision for logical theories, given that any such method will somehow depend on some logic for its revision process.
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