Pragmatism of concepts and circularity

Abstract

Pragmatism presented multiple implications in the most diverse areas of philosophy. Fodor has tried to show some of the problems that taking such a stance entails in the study of cognition. Particularly in the study of concepts. As he presents it, Conceptual Pragmatism focuses its approach to concepts in epistemic terms, as observed in the possession conditions it maintains: (i) being able to make certain inferences involving the concept and (ii) being able to properly sort those entities in its extension. According to Fodor, the primacy of epistemic clauses reveals a confusion in the proper explanatory order, leading to problems of circularity. In this paper I will argue for a defense Pragmatists could hold in response. After introducing the positions in question, I will evaluate Fodor's arguments and present a proposal that, while respecting the mentioned conditions, does not imply any problem among those indicated.