Is the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives effective against the abductive defense of scientific realism?

Abstract

The debate about scientific realism deals with the relationship between our best  scientific theories and the world. In this debate, what it is under discussion is, above all, whether there is a reason to believe that the parts of our scientific theories that deal with  unobservable phenomena and entities refer, albeit roughly, to real phenomena and entities. Given this, realists defend the thesis that our best scientific theories are approximately true. In 1975, Hilary Putnam proposed an argument in favor of scientific realism, considering that realism “(...) is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle.” (PUTNAM, 1975, p. 73). This argument became known as the Miracle Argument, being part of the strategy called the abductive defense of scientific realism. In his book Exceeding our grasp (2006), Kyle Stanford develops what he consider as a new challenge to this realistic defense strategy. The aim of this paper is to analyze whether this Stanford’s objection is plausible against the abductive defense of scientific realism.