On the possibility of a representationalist interpretation of thomistic epistemology

Abstract

The complex nature of Thomist epistemology is partly due to the fact that it is the point of convergence of theses from a complex tradition that preceded it, and that it brings together various metaphysical, anthropological and epistemic theses. Two theses underlie his theory: 1) the sensitive experience of the cognizing subject concerns singular objects that are external to it; 2) the intellect knows things in an immaterial and universal way, that is, transcending those singular instances, the cognitive act aims at the quidity of objects. In this context, it is legitimate to ask how the objects of perception, experienced as particular and concrete, are given to the intellect in an immaterial and universal way? What makes mental content correspond to the thing it expresses? The answers offered have divided interpreters into two currents, the direct realists and the representationalists. While the realists defend a dyadic relationship in which thought reaches its object directly, the representationalists, arguing that there is a triadic relationship, believe that the intellect knows the thing through a third mental item (image, likeness, representation). In this article, we seek to defend the possibility of a representationalist interpretation. In this article, we seek to defend the possibility of a representationalist interpretation. To substantiate this, we will analyze the breadth of the concept of similitudo and representation, which will be taken as principles for interpreting the items placed by St. Thomas in the immanence of the intellect (species intelligibiles and verbum mentis). Finally, we will discuss some passages that we believe are more coherently interpreted from a representationalist point of view.