The Beardsley-Dickie Debate on the Nature of Aesthetic Experience
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266429Keywords:
aesthetics, aesthetic experience, Beardsley-Dickie debate, phenomenal characterAbstract
The debate between Monroe Beardsley and George Dickie in the latter half of the 20th century significantly influenced contemporary discussions on the nature of aesthetic experience. Dickie claims that Beardsley, by attributing characteristics such as intensity, complexity, and unity (coherence and completeness) to aesthetic experience, confuses the properties of the object being experienced with those of the experience itself. Initially, Beardsley advocated a phenomenological approach to aesthetic experience. However, in response to Dickie’s criticisms, he shifted toward an epistemic approach, according to Gary Iseminger. In this paper, I present the Beardsley-Dickie debate and then analyze the purported transition from a phenomenological to an epistemic conception of aesthetic experience. Furthermore, I argue that this classification presents problems, based on brief considerations about the phenomenal character of experience and the relationship between aesthetic value and aesthetic experience.
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