The Politics of Knowledge

from Individual Ethics to Structural Transformation

Abstract

This article examines the limits of Fricker's (2007) theory of epistemic injustice, arguing that its normative proposal, centered on the individual cultivation of ethical and epistemic virtues is insufficient to address the structural and intentional dimensions of oppression. The analysis unfolds in three phases. First, it critically reconstructs Fricker's theory, arguing that its virtue-based solution stems from diagnosing prejudice as a spontaneous failure of individual perception. It presents the critiques of Anderson, Dotson, and Medina, who converge in pointing out the excessively individualistic nature of this approach. Second, it deepens the understanding of racism as a political-epistemic project of domination, mobilizing contributions from black Brazilian intellectuals (Carneiro, Gonzalez, Bento) to argue that epistemic injustices constitute intrinsic and intentionally structured elements within systems of domination. The analysis examines how whiteness functions as a normative position that shapes epistemic practices and how the myth of racial democracy operates to conceal this structural intentionality. Third, it proposes thought exercises that illustrate how the salience and devaluation of identity characteristics result from articulated systems of power that deliberately mark, hierarchize, and subordinate. The article concludes that effectively addressing epistemic injustices requires profound structural transformations in the institutions and systems that organize our knowledge practices, shifting the emphasis from individual ethics to structural transformation and recognizing that such systems often operate not by accident, but by design.