Logical realism and the metaphysics of logic

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2018.242293

Palabras clave:

logical realism

Resumen

Traduction.

Biografía del autor/a

Michaela Markham McSweeney, Universidade de Princeton; Universidade de Boston

Doutora pela Universidade de Princeton/EUA, atualmente é professora assistente na Universidade de Boston/EUA.

Evelyn Erickson, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Doutoranda no Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia da UFRN e tradutora do texto: Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic.

Citas

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Realismo e Antirrealismo

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2020-02-17

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Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2018): Realismo e Antirrealismo

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