O argumento do conhecimento: uma nova estratégia fisicista
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.247941Keywords:
knowledge argument, phenomenal concept strategy, nonconceptual contentsAbstract
This article presents an alternative defense of type B materialism in Jackson's knowledge Argument. To start with, I argue that on her release, Mary newly acquired content is essentially non-conceptual in the light of all available criteria. Mary's acquisition of such content is precisely what allows us to explain both her epistemic progress and the increase of her expertise regarding her old concept PHENOMENAL RED. Yet, while the acquisition of such non-conceptual content is indispensable, it is still insufficient to explain Mary's epistemic progress. Conceptual contents are required. Now, assuming that concepts are mental files, Mary’s newly acquired non-conceptual content of RED must be “digitalized” in order to be stored in the correspondent mental file PHENOMENAL RED. It is based on this concept, now phenomenally enriched by the newly acquired non-conceptual contents, that Mary becomes able to pick out the phenomenal character of her new visual experience of the color introspectively.
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