Experimentos mentais como argumentos: objeções à abordagem de Norton
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.247942Palabras clave:
Norton, experimentos mentais, conhecimento, justificação, argumentos, inferênciaResumen
Entende-se que os experimentos mentais são dispositivos da imaginação que podem nos fornecer crenças que constituem conhecimento. John D. Norton apresentou uma abordagem que se tornou influente para explicar como os experimentos mentais científicos podem produzir novos conhecimentos sobre o mundo. Ele afirma que não há nada distintivo nos experimentos mentais, uma vez que sustenta que eles funcionam exatamente como argumentos. Neste artigo, contestamos sua abordagem. Examinamos aspectos essenciais de sua abordagem, que envolvem as noções de “argumento” e “inferência” para mostrar que um sujeito que chega a saber algo através da execução ou condução de um experimento mental dificilmente será considerado como tendo efetivamente executado um argumento ou um processo de raciocínio inferencial.
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