Tolerancia a la inconsistencia en las ciencias sociales: contradicciones entre teoría y observación en la Economía
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248950Palabras clave:
tolerancia a la inconsistencia, contradicciones entre teoría y observación, economíaResumen
Aquí defendemos que el estudio de la tolerancia a la inconsistencia en las ciencias sociales –específicamente, la tolerancia a las contradicciones entre teoría y observación–, puede ser revelador con respecto a los mecanismos que subyacen al uso racional de la información inconsistente. Para hacerlo, ofrecemos una tipología de contradicciones de este tipo. Enfatizamos algunos de los aspectos destacados de estas contradicciones, y defendemos que dichos aspectos tienen un papel importante para la selección de los mecanismos inferenciales que permiten la tolerancia a las contradicciones. Ilustramos esto con casos de economía.
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