Anti-exceptionalism about logic and the a priori/a posteriori divide
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.263122Palabras clave:
anti-exceptionalism, a priori, a posteriori, bootstrapping, epistemology of logicResumen
Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic is not special; it is just like empirical science in many respects. In particular, it is thought that an anti-exceptionalist must also hold that logical theories are completely \emph{a posteriori}. However, it is not clear what it means to say that logical theories are a posteriori, for the a priori/a posteriori divide has been explored from different perspectives in contemporary philosophy. The central claim of this paper is to argue that logical anti-exceptionalism is quite compatible with the a priori, if the a priori/a posteriori divide is understood in the lines recently developed by Tuomas Tahko. The conception advanced by Tahko is characterized by an interplay between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, generating a bootstrapping relation in which one kind of knowledge constantly substantiates the other. We further present some of the advantages of the bootstrapping approach over the current epistemology associated with anti-exceptionalism.
Citas
BECKER ARENHART, J. R. Abductivism as a New Epistemology for Logic? Erkenntnis, Springer, v. 89, n. 6, p. 2397–2415, 2024.
BECKER ARENHART, J. R. Logical anti-exceptionalism meets the “logic-as-models” approach. Theoria, Wiley Online Library, v. 88, n. 6, p. 1211–1227, 2022.
BIGGS, S.; WILSON, J. M. Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is aposteriori? Synthese, Springer, v. 200, n. 3, p. 209, 2022.
BOGHOSSIAN, P. Knowledge of logic. In: BOGHOSSIAN, P. P. (Ed.). New essays on the a priori. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 229–254.
BUENO, O. Can a Paraconsistent Theorist be a Logical Monist? Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics, New York; Marcel Dekker; 1999, p. 535–552, 2002.
CHAKRAVARTTY, A. On the prospects of naturalized metaphysics. In: ROSS D.; LADYMAN, J.; KINCAID, H. (Ed.). Scientific Metaphysics. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 27–50.
FRANKS, C. Logical Nihilism. In: HIRVONEN, A. e. a. (Ed.). Logic Without Borders. [S.l.]: Walter de Gruyter, 2015. P. 147–166.
HJORTLAND, O. T. Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical studies, Springer, v. 174, p. 631–658, 2017.
HJORTLAND, O. T. What counts as evidence for a logical theory? The Australasian Journal of Logic, v. 16, n. 7, p. 250–282, 2019.
MARTIN, B. Identifying logical evidence. Synthese, Springer, v. 198, n. 10, p. 9069–9095, 2021.
MARTIN, B. The philosophy of logical practice. Examining Philosophy Itself, Wiley Online Library, p. 151–174, 2023.
MARTIN, B.; HJORTLAND, O. T. Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection. Synthese, Springer, v. 200, n. 2, p. 148, 2022.
MOLICK, S. Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise. Principia: an international journal of epistemology, v. 25, n. 1, p. 27–43, 2021.
PRIEST, G. In contradiction. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, USA, 2006.
PRIEST, G. Logical disputes and the a priori. Logique et Analyse, v. 236, p. 347–366, 2016.
PRIEST, G. Mathematical pluralism. Logic Journal of the IGPL, v. 21, n. 1, p. 4–13, 2013.
ROUTELY, R. Ultralogic as Universal? In: ROUTLEY, R. (Ed.). Exploring Meinong’s jungle and beyond. An investigation of noneism and the theory of items. [S.l.]: Departmental Monograph, Philosophy Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
SHAPIRO, S. Varieties of logic. [S.l.]: Oxford University Press, 2014.
TAHKO, T. A priori or a posteriori? In: BLISS R.; MILLER, J. T. M. (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook on Metametaphysics. [S.l.]: Routledge, 2021. P. 353–363.
TAHKO, T. E. A new definition of a priori knowledge: In search of a modal basis. Metaphysica, Springer, v. 9, p. 57–68, 2008.
TAHKO, T. E. A priori and a posteriori: A bootstrapping relationship. Metaphysica, Springer, v. 12, n. 2, p. 151–164, 2011.
TAJER, D. Anti-exceptionalism and methodological pluralism in logic. Synthese, Springer, v. 200, n. 3, p. 195, 2022.
WARENSKI, L. Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori. Philosophical Studies, Springer, v. 142, p. 403–426, 2009.
WEBER, Z.; OMORI, H. Observations on the trivial world. Erkenntnis, Springer, v. 84, p. 975–994, 2019.
Descargas
Publicado
Número
Sección
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2025 Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart, Sanderson Molick
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
A Revista Perspectiva Filosófica orienta seus procedimentos de gestão de artigos conforme as diretrizes básicas formuladas pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). http://memoria2.cnpq.br/web/guest/diretrizes/
Autores que publicam nesta revista concordam com os seguintes termos:
-
Os autores mantém os direitos autorais e concedem à revista o direito de primeira publicação, sendo o trabalho simultaneamente licenciado sob Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional que permite o compartilhamento do trabalho com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista.
-
Os autores têm autorização para assumir contratos adicionais separadamente, para distribuição não-exclusiva da versão do trabalho publicada nesta revista, com reconhecimento de autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista (Consultar http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html).
As obras publicadas pela Revista Perspectiva Filosófica estão licenciadas com Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.
