Non-naïve direct realism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253881

Keywords:

direct realism, sense data, argument of illusion, philosophy of perception

Abstract

This paper aims to answer some main arguments against direct realism. It is based on two theses: that of the Janus face of perceptual experience, and that of the cognitive primacy of sensory content (sense data). Together they help us give better answers to the old arguments of illusion and of science against direct realism.

References

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Published

2022-05-03

Issue

Section

Dossiê temático sobre Epistemologia, Filosofia da Ciência e Naturalismo