Scientific representation and realist perspectivism. towards a naturalist articulation

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2021.250135

Keywords:

Representation, Perspectivism, Realism, Naturalism

Abstract

This paper argues for the project of a perspectivist theory of scientific representation, and for the idea that realist perspectivism can benefit from the contributions of the field of scientific representation and from the acceptance of a naturalistic attitude. The classification of theories of representation into substantive and deflationary is reviewed and it is shown that the adoption of scientific representation as the unit of analysis does not imply a realist commitment. The main features of the current realist perspectivism in philosophy of science are presented, and the major challenges it faces are highlighted. It is also shown that scientific representation as a unit of analysis allows a better articulation of the perspectivist thesis. Finally, the adoption of perspective-neutral criteria of epistemic acceptability and a naturalistic attitude are proposed to overcome the difficulties of realist perspectivism.

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Published

2021-04-11

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Vol. 48 No. 1 (2021): Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

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Dossiê temático dedicado à Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

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