FEDERALISM, TERRITORY AND BORDERS

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATIVE MODEL IN LIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN AND AUSTRALIAN MODELS

Abstract

This article comparatively analyzes the Brazilian federative model in light of the Russian and Australian models, focusing on the constitutional axis and on the relationship between territorial organization, geographic scale, and border dimension. Its objective is to identify how different federal arrangements respond, at the constitutional level, to the challenges of integrating extensive territories, coordinating multiple levels of government, and preserving state unity. The study adopts a qualitative, descriptive-analytical, and comparative approach based on documentary analysis of constitutional texts and specialized literature on federalism, comparative constitutionalism, and intergovernmental relations. It examines federal architecture, the distribution of powers, mechanisms for resolving normative conflicts, and instruments of territorial coordination in Brazil, Russia, and Australia. The findings show that being a large-scale federation does not produce a single model of power organization. Brazil presents a cooperative and multilevel federalism, marked by strong constitutional density and by the constitutional status of municipalities as autonomous entities; Russia shows a formally plural federation, yet strongly oriented toward the vertical unity of the State; and Australia combines enumerated federal powers, normative supremacy, and fiscal centrality. The article concludes that geography influences, but does not determine, federal design, and that constitutional and institutional choices are decisive in each case.