Ontological normativity and eurocentrism in Axel Honneth's theory: A critical deficit?

Abstract

First, this paper attempts to show that there is a confusion between what can be considered as normative and what can be seen as an ontological presupposition in Honneth’s theory. The idea is that in the construction of his criticism of Habermas, the supposed normative basis for which Critical Theory should turn its attention and its scientific, philosophical and political efforts is already part of the theory, so to speak, and not necessarily an immanent fact of social reality. From this problematic, two derived points emerge.  The first  is  to  demonstrate  that,  despite  Honneth’s  empirically  grounded  project,  the aforementioned ontological normativity is theoretically and politically constructed within a  strongly  Eurocentric  historical-evaluative  scope  with  universalist  pretensions.  The second point is to show that Honneth will pay a high price for not taking into account that, legitimized or not, the modern institutions he identifies as conditionings of social freedom vary in its importance and its effects depending on the socio-historical context. This,  I  argue,  would  have  weakened  the  critical  potential  of  Honneth’s  theory  of recognition.