Entre a autonomia da vontade kantiana e o princípio da autonomia de Beauchamp e Childress: Uma discussão acerca da autonomia e da dignidade humana na bioética e no direito

Abstract

The primary goal of this article is to discuss the relationship between autonomy and human dignity in bioethics and the law. In those terms, evidence-if the argument forwarded by Kant and the principle of the autonomy proposal designed by Beauchamp and Childress. According to theorists, autonomy is to be aware of this person's right to possess a life project itself, of having their views and opinions, to make autonomous choices, to act according to their values and beliefs. On the other hand, the Kantian autonomy presupposes the human capacity to determine according to principles or maxims laid by itself, free of empirical constraints, in a purely a priori. And as such is the Supreme principle of morality. Given these considerations, it is possible to highlight the similar aspects in the two respective determinations of autonomy? To answer that question, as well as discuss the purposes to be achieved it is necessary a discussion on determinations and assumption of autonomy of the will and of self-determination in the context of the principialista theory of bioethics. In view of this the question arises about the fundamental difference between autonomy and respect for autonomy.