A ideia de liberdade social na Filosofia do direito de Hegel: reconstrução seletiva de modelos modernos de liberdade segundo seu déficit intersubjetivo

Abstract

The present article aims to analyze how Hegel formulate in Philosophy of Right his concept of freedom socially mediated from the interpretation of models of freedom that have influenced the self-understanding of the west at the issue. For this, negative and reflective models of freedom are analyzed which are, according to Hegel, parts of the axiological solo of modernity. Being part, Hegel can’t dismiss them but must establish their position in the interior of the modern social system. The argument of the article aims to explain the mentioned models from their insufficiency, namely, the lack of intersubjectivity that they interpreted the concept of freedom making the otherness not essential to freedom itself. Divided in three parts, the first one aims to furnish the actual context of interpretation of the text in which is suspended some problems raised against Hegel’s philosophy, is used Axel Honneth, Allen Wood e Westphal; in the second one, are explored those models of freedom mentioned and are pointed out the deficit of intersubjectivity. In the end is pointed out how Hegel understands freedom according to its own intersubjective bound of self-realization in communicative spheres of community.