Sobre o verificacionismo e restrições ao princípio do terceiro excluído

Marcos Silva

doi:10.51359/2357-9986.2018.244723

Authors

Marcos Silva Universidade Federal de Alagoas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2018.244723

Keywords:

verificationism, expressivism, inferentialism, contradiction, contrariety, middle Wittgenstein

Abstract

Here I show how to relate Middle Wittgenstein’s problem with the expression of conceptual relations among colors to some problems to his verificationist remarks. Some problems concerning the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM) are also discussed in the context of Satzsysteme and verificationism in the the discussions with the Vienna Circle. For that, this work investigates the so-called color exclusion problem and its impact on the Tractarian notational means, however, showing that truth-table notation can express relations of contrariety, subcontrary and contradictoriness through systematic mutilations of its lines. I also examine how and why (PEM) seems to be not valid among phenomenological systems.

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Sobre o verificacionismo e restrições ao princípio do terceiro excluído

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