O que é preciso para ser um externista em epistemologia?

Authors

  • João R. Fett Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
  • Gregory Gaboardi Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.247943

Keywords:

internalism, externalism, justification, defeaters

Abstract

In this paper, we will explore two related questions: (i) What are the fundamental aspects of the internalism vs. externalism dispute in contemporary epistemology?; (ii) Is externalism compatible with a no-defeater clause? Both issues spark controversy. We will argue that there is a suitable answer to our first question: the internalism vs. externalism dispute is at its core one about which role the mind-world relations play in the acquisition of epistemic justification. Based on that claim, we will hold that there is also a suitable answer to our second question: an externalist may well adhere to a nodefeater clause. Such results will allow us to show that some significant claims regarding the internalism vs. externalism dispute that people have made recently in the literature are incorrect.

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Published

2020-08-19

Issue

Vol. 46 No. 1 (2019): Epistemologia Contemporânea - Primeira Parte: Questões de Epistemologia Analítica

Section

Dossiê de Epistemologia Contemporânea

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