Ética da crença, fake news e responsabilidade
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.247946Keywords:
ethics of belief, epistemic normativity, epistemic vices, epistemic responsibilities, fake newsAbstract
This paper aims to discuss the ethics of belief and the relationship between epistemic responsibility and moral responsibility, in order to apply the discussion to the evaluation of cases involving the use of social media to obtain fake news and share them. To achieve this goal, I will first discuss the norms of Clifford's ethics of belief in the first section, and thus, in the second section, criticize the idea of the correlation between epistemic and moral responsibility advocated by Clifford. In the third section I will present Cassam's theory of epistemic vices, so that, in the final section, evaluate cases involving fake news and social media from the perspective of epistemic vices. I will close the paper with a brief discussion of the risks of proposing laws that seek to criminalize fake news without proper discussion.References
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