Variedades do enativismo: propostas radicais e cognição superior
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2019.248072Keywords:
Philosophy of cognitive sciences, autopoietic enactivism, sensorimotor enactivism, Radical enactivism, higher cognitionAbstract
Since the 90th decade of the 20th century an interdisciplinary research pro-gram the trespass the areas of Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology, ArtificialIntelligence, Embodied Robotics and Linguistics has carving up space underthe name Enactivism. Show and contextualize the more radical enactive ap-proaches to high cognition is our goal in this paper. A significant motivationto have a positive attitude towards enactivism is its success in explanationsof vision that emphasize the active character of perception. For a certainenactivist reading visual perception is a kind of basic (non-representational)cognition that can be explained in a relational manner, through the skills ofthe cognitive agent engage in a determined environment and its characteris-tics. Follows that the perception is similar to, if not identified as, know-how.An overview of the varieties of enactivism is traced, with the goal of un-derstanding the anti-representational perspectives; with that is possible toapproach treatment, from a radical perspective, to the contexts that at firstglance demand the notion of representation in its explanation (contexts ofwhat could be call higher cognition). The varieties are the radical enactivism(REC), the autpoietic enactivism and the sensorimotor enactivism. After theexposition, we discuss some problems and possibilities of progress of the ra-dical explanation of higher cognition.References
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