Pessimistic induction: metaphysical and methodological commitments

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2021.250132

Keywords:

Scientific realism, Pessimistic induction, Induction problem, Constructive empiricism

Abstract

In this paper, we explore a problematic aspect of the main argument in favor of scientific antirealism, the Pessimistic Induction (PI). Our analysis focuses on the observation that whoever wants to use PI as an effective argument should have good reasons to trust induction as a form of ampliative reasoning in the first place. This involves taking a position regarding the so-called induction problem and the possible strategies to solve it. We maintain that the possible strategies of the PI defender in the face of the problem of induction lead to stronger commitments than those he tries to avoid with his argument. Although this does not constitute a refutation of the PI nor of the possible forms of antirealism that it supports, we affirm that it puts the antirealist in a pragmatic inconsistency regarding the adoption of metaphysical commitments that hinders the general defense of her position.

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Published

2021-04-11

Issue

Vol. 48 No. 1 (2021): Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

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Dossiê temático dedicado à Filosofia Analítica Sul-Americana

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