Primary reason, intention and non-human animals
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2021.250138Keywords:
Intentional action, primary reason, planning theory of intentionAbstract
In this paper my claim is twofold. First, I will make a critical analysis of Davidson’s theory of action, according to it a mere bodily movement becomes an intentional action when it is justified, rationalized and caused by primary reason, which is constituted by a conative attitude – desire – and a cognitive one – belief. Davidson, however, does not take an intention as a distinctive mental attitude and ends up reducing it to the primary reason. I will take Bratman’s planning theory of intention in order to make a critical analysis of Davidson’s theory. Bratman’s theory will be treated as an extension of Davidson’s theory. Bratman claims that non-human animals are not planner agents, thus they cannot engage in intentional planned actions. Secondly, I will make a critique over Bratman’s stipulative demarcation in order to extend intentional planned actions towards non-human animals.References
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