Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892

Keywords:

epistemic peers, philosophical disagreement, skepticism, metaphilosophy

Abstract

We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.

Author Biographies

Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)

Mestre pela Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC), Fortaleza – CE. Grupo Filosofia, Metafísica e Cognição, Universidade Federal do Ceará.

Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues, Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)

Professor na Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC), Fortaleza – CE. Grupo LANCOG, Lisboa, Portugal.

References

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Published

2022-05-03

Issue

Vol. 49 No. 2 (2022): Epistemologia, Filosofia da Ciência e Naturalismo & Filósofas no Norte

Section

Dossiê temático sobre Epistemologia, Filosofia da Ciência e Naturalismo

License

Copyright (c) 2022 Octavio Andres Garcia Aguiar; Luis Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues

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