Enativism and moral pschology: learning (together) to be people
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.256761Keywords:
enactivism, moral psychology, habits, human becoming, ethical dimension of experienceAbstract
In this paper I present the enactive approach and a review of the enactive li-terature that aims to give contributions to ethical thought. I show how wefind in the enactive approach a moral psychology that is against universalis-tic moral perspectives. By moral psychology I mean a robust understandingof the human mind, what it is and its development, as it is relevant to morallife. By universalistic moral perspectives, I want to refer to theories that takemoral questions to be fundamentally about moral choices, henceforth, thatmoral philosophy must be oriented around discussions of which principlesmust (universally) guide our chosen actions. After presenting the enactiveimage of human moral psychology, we will see that it needs to be supple-mented by an account of what constitutes the ethical dimension of experience.References
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