Philosophical commitments implicit in the translation-calculation analysis of informal arguments

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.263844

Keywords:

informal logic, Epistemology of Logic, vagueness

Abstract

If we assume that formal Logic can contribute to the analysis procedures of informal Logic, one of its contributions is the translation-calculation strategy, which seems to be very common in the teaching of Logic. I argue that this translation strategy presupposes the adoption of a theory of vagueness, even if tacitly. I also argue that the teaching of Logic, by resorting to translation-design as a pedagogical tool, adopts semantic nihilism as its theory of vagueness. I also argue that choosing one theory of vagueness over another is a gesture with possibly relevant logical (formal) repercussions. I illustrate this point by comparing semantic nihilism to supervaluationism, a theory of vagueness structurally similar to nihilism that, nevertheless, causes loss of truth-functionality. Finally, I raise some issues with a suspicion regarding the value of informal Logic as a discipline. This discussion does not intend to address in depth the philosophical problem of vagueness, or to evaluate the merits or lack thereof of semantic nihilism or supervaluationism as theories of vagueness. The aim is to contribute to the epistemology of Logic and to illustrate what sort of repercussion vagueness, and its theories, have on the relationship between formal and informal Logic.

References

BRAUN, D.; SIDER, T. Vague, So Untrue. Noûs, v. 41, n. 2, p. 133–156, 2007. Disponível em: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4494524.

CARNIELLI, W. A.; EPSTEIN, R. L. Pensamento crítico: O poder da lógica e da argumentação. 2. ed. São Paulo: Rideel, 2010.

ERICKSON, E. Anti-excepcionalismo e a metodologia da lógica. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 502–528, 2020. DOI: http://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248948.

GROARKE, L. How to Define an Informal Logic. In: Rigour and reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen. Edição: J. Anthony Blair e Christopher W. Tindale. Windsor: University of Windsor Press, 2020. P. 231–251. (Windsor Studies in Argumentation). Disponível em: https://windsor.scholarsportal.info/omp/index.php/wsia/catalog/book/180.

GROARKE, L. Informal Logic. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2024. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2024. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/logic-informal.

HAACK, S. Filosofia das lógicas. Tradução: Cezar A. Mortari e Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2002.

HANSEN, H. V.; COHEN, D. H. Are there methods of informal logic? In: ZENKER, F. (Ed.). Argumentation: Community and Cognition. Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. Windsor: Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric, 2012. P. 1–13. Disponível em: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/15.

HINTIKKA, J. The role of logic in argumentation. en. The Monist, v. 72, n. 1, p. 3–24, 1989. Disponível em: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903120.

KEEFE, R. Theories of vagueness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy).

LEWIŃSKI, M. The Straw Man and its Baby Semantics. In: Rigour and reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen. Edição: J. Anthony Blair e Christopher W. Tindale. Windsor: University of Windsor Press, 2020. P. 276–303. (Windsor Studies in Argumen-

tation). Disponível em: https://windsor.scholarsportal.info/omp/index.php/wsia/catalog/book/180.

MORTARI, C. A. Introdução à lógica. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2001.

PUGLIESE, N. A continuidade entre os métodos formais e informais de demonstração na prática filosófica. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 26–60, 2020. DOI: http://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.246267.

WILLIAMSON, T. Vagueness. London, New York: Routledge, 1994.

WILLIAMSON, T.; SIMONS, P. Vagueness and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, v. 66, p. 145–177, 1992. Disponível em: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106976.

Published

2025-12-04

Issue

Section

Perspectiva Contemporâneas em Filosofia da Lógica