Attentional progress by conceptual engineering
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266964Keywords:
agenda-setting concepts, conceptual construction, conceptual elimination, conceptual engineering, ethics of attentionAbstract
Does conceptual engineering as a philosophical method deserve all the attention it has been receiving recently? One might argue that important philosophical questions are about the world, not about how our concepts are or ought to be. This article presents a way in which conceptual engineering can contribute to philosophical progress. The suspicion that conceptual engineering is receiving too much attention presupposes that it is important to properly distribute our philosophical attention (for example, that conceptual engineering should not receive more than its fair share). The defense of conceptual engineering offered in this article is based on that very presupposition. It is argued that conceptual engineering is a way of shaping philosophers’ patterns of attention for the better: it serves the progress of attention in philosophy.
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