Sameness of Subject Matter in Conceptual Amelioration
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266965Keywords:
conceptual engineering, conceptual amelioration, sameness of subject matter, topic continuity, chains of meaningAbstract
Projects of conceptual engineering that aim to ameliorate concepts face the chal- lenge of topic continuity. In some instances of conceptual amelioration, a particularly strong kind of continuity is needed: Sameness of subject matter. This paper examines how sameness of subject matter can be maintained in conceptual ame- lioration. It starts from a view that sees concepts as ways of thinking, implying that to change a concept is to replace it. At first sight, this view seems incompatible with maintaining sameness of subject matter in conceptual amelioration. Accordingly, Sally Haslanger and Sarah Sawyer have suggested accounts of conceptual amelioration that do without replacing concepts. On their accounts, the persisting concept is supposed to guarantee sameness of subject matter. However, both ac- counts face problems. Therefore, I suggest a different account to maintain same- ness subject matter inspired by Bartels’s chains of meaning theory. On this ac- count, sameness of subject matter is guaranteed through a common referent of the pre- and the post-amelioration concept, established from the post-amelioration perspective. The account allows for sameness of subject matter even though concepts are replaced in the ameliorative process.
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