Reconciling Logical Pluralism and Meaning-Theoretical Stability

Revisiting Logical Exceptionality by Rereading Dummett’s Theory of Meaning and Inference

Résumé

The article examines how Dummett redefines the unique role of logic through a meaning-theoretical framework grounded in anti-realist philosophy. We argue that Dummett’s thesis provides a non-anti-exceptionalist approach to addressing the plurality and revisability of logical systems. First, he emphasizes inference as the primary basis for meaning, with truth and assertion being justified through inferential harmony rather than through projectivist commitments to a supersensible reality. Second, it critiques classical and modal logic for their reliance on rigid realist metaphysical assumptions and their neglect of the epistemic grasp of ingredient sense. In contrast, Dummett’s intuitionism prioritizes constructive methods of meaning-making, offering a flexible yet coherent framework for reconciling truth, assertion, and meaning. Dummett’s theory of meaning will be our main focus, because if Quine's critique of deeper (intensional) foundations of meaning effectively removed the theoretical justification that distinguishes logic from other domains, then restoring logic’s exceptional status requires addressing and reversing the effects of Quine’s critique. Finally, the article argues that logic’s unique role lies in its pragmatic ability to stabilize meaning and guide inferential practices, affirming its foundational status even within a pluralistic and fallible epistemic landscape. Although logic is continuous with the formation of meaning coming from various sources (including empirical sources), it is exceptional in the fundamental sense that it represents the ideal stage of justification in any stable phase of our judgment practice and assertion strategy.