Reconsidering the exceptionality of logic
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.263874Mots-clés :
Anti-exceptionalism, Logical practice, Non-classical logics, analyticityRésumé
By appealing to evidence from the philosophical literature and from logical practice, I argue that anti-exceptionalism about logic is, in many aspects, not well justified. In the first part, I claim that the apriority of logic is still very alive in the philosophical literature, and the classic arguments by Quine have been seriously challenged. In the second part, I focus on logical practice, and I argue that logic is not revisable in the usual sense. Contemporary logical research is mostly based on classical logic as a lingua franca, and there are good reasons to think that only classical logic can play that role. Only some parts of logical research involve the possibility of a deeper revision. In the last section, I claim that one aspect in which logic can be shown to be similar to other sciences is the methodological one, for logical practice can be characterized using models and theories from general philosophy of science.
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