What is Epistemology of Conversation?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2025.266036

Keywords:

conversation, joint agency, epistemic trust

Abstract

This essay presents an epistemological approach to “conversation” as a joint agency, i.e., a social activity in which participants cooperate to generate, transmit and evaluate cognitive states of individuals and groups. Conversation is understood as linguistic exchange between autonomous individuals on matters of common interest. Considering this, epistemic trust between participants is a requirement fundamental for a conversation to take place. Among the motivations for a conversation are situations of epistemic disagreement and the search for epistemic goods through joint understanding. In this entry, I argue that conversation is a method of investigation that promotes the acquisition of knowledge, understanding and the achievement of epistemic consensus between different agents. Finally, I claim that conversation, in the epistemic sense, is crucial for cooperation in pluralistic societies.

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Published

2025-12-04

Issue

Vol. 52 No. 2 (2025): Perspectivas Contemporâneas em Filosofia da Lógica

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Seção livre

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